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ABSTRACT
within the discipline of rhetoric and composition, the
notion of coherence possesses the status of sine qua non,
yet this notion has been treated unevenly or been taken for
granted, much as the process of composing itself was taken
for granted for the better part of this century.

This

practice has occurred for the following reasons: coherence
is the "unmarked" condition of speech, and by transfer, also
the "unmarked" condition of writing; the surface language of
a composition has traditionally been the focus for solving
any problems of coherence; and, collateral disciplines have
not been sufficiently drawn upon in understanding the global
nature of those elements which cohere a successful
composition.
The author posits that virtually all cohering elements
fall within three global categories, linguistic, cognitive,
or contextually salient, and, moreover, that these cohering
elements occur on a continuum that extends from the explicit
to the implicit.

The linguistic category includes

co-reference, repetition, anaphora, cataphora, and ellipsis.
The cognitive category includes the given/new relationship,
Gestalt, parallel distributed processing, and central
cognitive processes.

The contextually salient category
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includes warrants, register, central metaphors, sociological
models, and epistemological frames.
Such an approach redistributes the burden of our
understanding coherence from the surface language of a
composition to a tripartite focus, including not only
surface language, but also elements beneath it and beyond
it, thus providing a manageable framework for the analysis
of coherence, commonly recognized as the most essential
quality of any composition.
The study concludes with implications this approach has
for the teaching of composition and rhetoric in the college
classroom.
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CHAPTER!
BACKGROUND OF GLOBAL COHERENCE
A Historical Sketch of the Concept
Interest in a coherent text dates from the classical
period of rhetoric.

Aristotle, while not using the term

coherence or global coherence, clearly presupposed it in his

Poetics when describing the "organic whole" as "the
structural union of the parts [of the text] being such that,
if anyone of them is displaced or removed, the whole will
be disjointed and disturbed" (35).

Horace exhorts "let your

work be what you will, provided only it be uniform and a
whole" (68).
Longinus, in On the Sublime, tells us more: " . . . we
see skill in invention, and due order and arrangement of
matter, emerging as the hard-won result not of one thing nor
of two, but of the whole texture of the composition" (43).
Longinus continues:
NOw, there inhere in all things by nature
certain constituents which are part and parcel of
their substance.
It must needs be, therefore,
that we shall find one source of the sublime in
the systematic selection of the most important
elements, and the power of forming, by their
mutual combination, what may be called one body.
(69)

Longinus places particular emphasis on the notion that
"there inhere in all things by nature certain constituents
which are part and parcel of their sUbstance."

However, he
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does not elaborate on these "certain constituents," nor on
how they "inhere in all things by nature."

Throughout this

study in global coherence, I shall seek to identify these
certain constituents and indicate how they cohere a
composition.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first
recorded use of the word coherence in English occurred in
1604 when Robert Cawdrey published A Table Alphabeticall of
Hard English Words, in which he listed, "cohaerence, ioning,

and vniting together" (30); in 1659, Thomas Fuller used the
word in The Appeal of Injured Innocence: "A naked sentence .
.

. disarmed of the coherence before and after it"

(5); and

in 1678, Thomas Hobbes made use of the word in Decameron
Physiologicum: or, Ten Dialogues of Natural Philosophy: "

. the points of Contact will be many (which make the
coherence stronger)" (ix. 108).
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines
coherence as "the quality or state of cohering .

.

.

systematic or methodical connectedness or interrelatedness
esp. when governed by logical principles" (440); the same
dictionary defines global as "emphasizing a totality rather
than the constitutive elements of a totality .
comprehensive . . . total" (965).

. .

Accordingly, for the

purpose of this study, I offer the following working
definition of the term global coherence: the comprehensive,
systematic connection of constitutive elements of a
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composition or essay, with a consistent emphasis on both the
totality of the text and on the interrelatedness of its
constituents.

Contemporary Research on Global Coherence
A review of related scholarship indicates that the
concept of coherence has been treated in varying degrees and
from different perspectives in composition and rhetoric,
with the notion of global coherence often alluded to or
assumed, but rarely addressed directly or in detail.

For

example, the CCCC Bibliography of Composition and Rhetoric,
1987 lists "Teaching Coherence Techniques" as a subject in
its index, yet of 265 entries in the indicated section, one
entry deals with unity, another entry deals in part with
organic form, and none deals with coherence or global
coherence (Lindeman); Research on written Composition, a
comprehensive review of over twenty years of research, does
not address coherence or global coherence (Hillocks); the
1987 Bedford Bibliography for Teachers of Writing lists two

articles and no books on coherence or global coherence
(Bizzell & Herzberg).
Richard Lanham, in his Handlist of Rhetorical Terms,
offers several related terms--composition, eutrepismus,
ordo, ordinatio, synathroesmus, and taxis--but each is
concerned with order, arrangement, or the putting together
of words, sentences, or parts of an oration one with the
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other, not with their interrelatedness at the global level.
Lanham writes:
Although extensively discussed in its component
details, the form of the oration [the text as a whole]
has not received the scholarly attention it deserves,
as the form that has governed a good deal of writing
and speaking not specifically rhetorical.
(112)
Linda Woodson, in her Handbook of Modern Rhetorical
Terms, does not list coherence or global coherence (nor
unity nor organic form, which are traditionally associated
with belles lettres).

She does list form, defining it as

"The structure of the complete piece of discourse or of its
identifiable parts" and likens it to dispositio in classical
rhetoric (25).

Such a definition, while naturally focusing

on the structure of the text, fails to focus on the
comprehensive, systematic interrelatedness of the text's
constitutive elements.
The topic of coherence has also been dealt with in
varying degrees and from different perspectives by authors
of composition textbooks.

Donald Davidson, in his American

composition and Rhetoric, first published in 1939, devotes
thirty-three pages to developing coherence in a composition,
giving examples from distinguished writers which illustrate
different methods of coherence; Davidson emphasizes cohesion
between the constituent parts of a composition while also
emphasizing the work as a whole, noting kinds of overall
order--"natural," "logical," and "instinctive" (39-40)--as
well as noting transitional devices between and within
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paragraphs and emphasizing concepts such as "guiding
purpose" (37) and "free association" (41).

Davidson then

provides two detailed methods for achieving a coherent
essay, followed by exercises for developing coherence.
The various authors of the Harbrace College Handbook,
published in numerous editions since 1941, devote
thirty-three pages to coherence: all but one of these pages
focus on coherence at the sentence level.
James M. McCrimmon, author of the widely used writing
with a Purpose, published from 1957 to the present, devotes
five pages to coherence.

Although McCrimmon offers the

student writer sample passages of several paragraphs which
are annotated for coherence throughout each passage, he
clearly focuses on coherence at the paragraph level,
defining coherence as "the integration of sentences within a
paragraph" (446).

For McCrimmon, paragraphs are

"compositions in miniature" (81), and "The best way to get
coherence in a paragraph is to think in paragraphs" (92).
Donald stewart, in his The Versatile writer (1986),
does not index coherence, clarity, form, or unity, nor does
he have any sections dealing with these or related concepts.
In all fairness to stewart, he does draw heavily from
classical arrangement to foster coherence.
Maxine Hairston and John Ruszkiewicz, in The Scott,
Foresman Handbook for writers (1991), also do not index
coherence, form, or unity, but they do address clarity,
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stating that the "first prize always goes to clarity" (183).
Hairston and Ruszkiewicz devote twenty-five pages to
clarity, but they do not address coherence at the essay
level, instead focusing almost exclusively on coherence
within, and not between, single paragraphs.
Unfortunately, errors of coherence have also been
treated unevenly in composition handbooks, which further
compounds the challenge of teaching students to write
globally coherent compositions.

Indeed, errors of coherence

have been treated, and consequently marked,
indiscriminately.

The marking of coherence errors has

traditionally taken place on errors at the sentence level,
as the following examples from the Harbrace College Handbook
illustrate:
[1:1]
a. When discussing creativity, a person's ability
to finish a pun is stressed by John E. Gibson.
b. When discussing creativity, John E. Gibson
stresses a person's ability to finish a pun.
(Hodges & Whitten 250)
[1:2]
a. We bought gasoline in Arkansas at.a small
country store which cost $3.12.
b. At a small country store in Arkansas, we bought
gasoline which cost $3.12.
(Hodges & Whitten
252)
Of course, the "a" sentences above do have problems, and the
"b" versions are more coherent, but Hodges and Whitten's
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restricting the marking of "coherence" errors to the
sentence level not only fails to reflect the various
elements of global cohere Once operating throughout a
composition, but such treatment of coherence errors also
restricts the student writer's level of thought--often to
only the literal level--thus influencing students to think
at this most basic level.

However, composition teachers

encourage their students to engage in and articulate at
various levels of thought--and thus various levels of
writing--beyond the literal level; composition teachers want
essays to represent higher-order thinking--interpretation,
analysis, evaluation, and creativity--and this higher-order
thinking demands language use beyond the literal level, a
level which often does not rise above the phrase or sentence
level.
Some recent handbooks, such as Corder and Ruszkiewicz's
Handbook of Current English, published in 1985, ignore

coherence errors at the sentence level and instead, focus
solely on coherence errors at the paragraph level, either
within a paragraph or between paragraphs, as the following
examples illustrate:
[l:3a]

(focus on intra-paragraph coherence)

Many people today believe that objectionable
movies should be censored by federal or local
agencies. The recent emphasis in American
films on immorality and violence is outrageous.
They are undermining our nation's morals and
our prestige abroad, according to many people.
There may be some truth here.
I agree with the
diagnosis, but I cannot accept the cure.
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Censorship poses a greater threat to a democracy,
in my opinion.
[1:3b]

(focus on intra-paragraph coherence)

Many people today believe that objectionable
movies should be censored by federal or local
agencies. These critics have been outraged by the
recent emphasis in American films on immorality
and violence. Such films, according to them, are
undermining our nation's morals and our prestige
abroad. This may be true. However, although I
agree with their diagnosis, I cannot accept their
cure.
It seems to me that censorship poses a
greater threat to a democracy than objectionable
entertainment.
(Corder & Ruszkiewicz 464-65)
Due to the changes noted, example "b" possesses
improved coherence.

For inter-paragraph coherence, Corder

and Ruszkiewicz offer the passage below.
[1:4]

(focus on inter-paragraph coherence)
Putting food into the weightless body has
always been a special challenge for NASA.
For a
while no one was sure if a human could eat
normally in zero-g. There were those who worried
that when John Glenn made the first American
around-the-world space flight he wouldn't be able
to swallow his food in weightlessness and would
choke to death. Once Glenn returned to earth, his
stomach full, his throat clear, extraterrestrial
meal planning began in earnest. Space meals have
progressed from such items as gelatin-coated
coconut cubes and peanut cubes to complete
heat-and-serve meals on board Skylab and the space
shuttle.
Space meals are not prepared so. much as
assembled. All the food is precooked and is
either canned, dehydrated, or packed in
aluminum-backed plastic envelopes called flex
pouches. Because it's impossible to pour water
in zero gravity (it congeals into silvery balls
that drift around in a spacecraft), dehydrated
food is revived by squirting water through a
needle into the sealed plastic pouches. Each
pouch has a flexible plastic top that lets the
cook knead the water into the dried food.
Liquids are drunk through a straw with a clamp
attached to keep the straw pinched shut when not
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in use. All are in containers shaped to fit
neatly into a compartmentalized and magnetized
food tray, where they are anchored in place by
Velcro tape.
Weightlessness affects not only how food is
packaged, but also what kind of food is inside.
Even without gravity, it is possible to eat some
foods off an open plate with a fork or spoon.
Meals with sauces or gravies work especially well
because they tend to stick to the plate and not
float away. The skylab astronauts, who tested
out many space meals, found some were disasters.
In one report to Earth, the first crew crossed
chili off their eating schedule.
Every time they
opened a container of it, there was an explosion
of food: "Great gobbets of chili go flying all
over; it's bad news."--Douglas Colligan, "The
Light stuff"
(Corder & Ruszkiewicz 465-66)
Corder and Ruszkiewicz, as do many other handbook
authors, choose not to provide a multi-paragraph passage
flawed with coherence errors, but they do point out that
example [1:4] employs repetition of "key words" and
"synonyms" in order to effect greater coherence (466).

Note

should be made, however, that inter-paragraph coherence is
also effected by other key elements of coherence, such as
reference, substitution, ellipsis, and conjunction, and
these elements need to be addressed.
Despite the uneven treatment given the notion of
coherence in the field of composition, it.was one of six
criteria used to evaluate freshman compositions in the
influential Miami of Ohio study (Kerek, Daiker, & Morenberg
1111); like ancient rhetoricians such as Aristotle, Horace,
and Longinus, modern rhetoricians also believe coherence is
the sine qua non of any composition.

If this is the case,

then how is it that compilers of current handlists of
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rhetoric and composition terminology do not mention or index
coherence (e.g., Lanham; Woodson)?

How is it that

researchers of the past twenty years in composition and
rhetoric do not address coherence (e.g., Hillocks)?

How is

it that bibliographers list coherence as a category with 265
entries but none deals with coherence (e.g., Lindeman)?

How

is it that college handbooks indiscriminately assign a
single proofreading symbol, "coh," to a multitude of errors
at the sentence level (dangling modifiers, misplaced
modifiers, faulty parallelism, etc.), at the intra-paragraph
level, and at the inter-paragraph level (e.g., Hodges &
Whitten; Hairston & Ruszkiewicz; Corder & Ruszkiewicz)?
The reasons the notion of coherence has been treated so
unevenly while continuing to possess the status of sine quo

non are three-fold:
Humans naturally assume that things "make sense";
"making sense" is the "unmarked" condition or quality of
language processing.

Because coherence is so much a

requisite of language processing, humans take it for granted
as much as they do the solidity of the ground beneath their
feet.

Coherence is part-and-parcel of normal speech; humans

do not communicate not to be understood, but instead to be
understood and to understand.

Coherence is assumed not only

of speech production, but also of written-language
production; however, the notion of coherence in a written
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text is much more involved than the notion of coherence in a
spoken utterance, as this study will demonstrate.
Secondly, composition teachers have focused too long on
the "surface language" of the text.

They read a sentence

constructed with a misplaced modifier and pause to wonder
just what is meant, but that experience does not justify
restricting their treatment of coherence to the sentence
level, and often, therefore, to the literal level of
language; they must instruct their student writers to go
beyond the literal level of language and thought so that the
student writers will not only think at the analytic,
interpretive, evaluative, and creative levels, but also
articulate at these higher levels of thought in globally
coherent essays.

Composition teachers appropriately mark

the incorrect use of therefore in student papers, but they
are remiss if they do not encourage student writers to look
at the underlying logical relationships of the clauses the
student writers are connecting, for that will give the
students an increased understanding of how parts of a
composition cohere in fundamental, cognitive ways.
composition teachers correctly alert their student writers
to the liabilities of sexist language and to the proper form
of a business letter, but it is far better to also teach
them about the implicit but overarching, powerful, and
ubiquitous influence contextual salience exerts in their
culture, and thus in their compositions.
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Aristotle defined rhetoric as "the faculty of
discovering in the particular case all the available means
of persuasion," and clearly, such a definition is a very
inclusive one (Aristotle xxxvii); in a personal interview,
Jim Corder defined rhetoric as "any purposive use of
language"; clearly, this definition is another very
inclusive one.

Whether one subscribes to Aristotle's

definition or to Corder's definition or to both, one must
agree that the discipline of composition and rhetoric is
very inclusive, and that the language one uses and the
resources one draws upon in fashioning a coherent text go
far beyond the actual language of the text.

Composition

teachers therefore must not limit themselves, nor their
language, to a text-bound view of coherence; they must not
place all the burden of coherence on the text's surface
language.

Instead, as they teach student writers to compose

globally coherent texts, they must alert the student writers
to the germane aspects of language use which the text's
surface language pre-supposes at the cognitive level,
instantiates at the literal level, and intimates at the
sociological level.
A third reason the notion of coherence has been treated
so unevenly while continuing to possess the status of sine

qua non is that composition teachers have not followed the
lead of linguists, for as linguists developed a keener and
deeper insight into what language is and how it works, their
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field grew beyond general or descriptive linguistics to
sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and neurolinguistics,
for example.

Teachers of composition and rhetoric have not

sufficiently availed themselves of this growth in
linguistics.

No doubt, composition teachers have made great

strides in moving from product to the process approach, in
reviving the essay to a status on par with literary
interpretation, and in achieving acceptance of
writing-across-the-curriculum.

Such strides have seen the

discipline of composition and rhetoric become increasingly
interdisciplinary.

These gains are real and have been good

for both teachers and students alike, but composition
teachers have not made similar gains in their understanding
of the most necessary quality of a composition--global
coherence.

Nonetheless, they can make significant gains if

they appropriately draw from advances offered them by their
many collateral disciplines.

They can draw, for example,

from the increased understanding provided in
psycholinguistics by using the concept of top down
processing.

As argued above, composition teachers have too

long focused primarily on the surface language of student
papers, and this has often led them into a bottom up
approach to the teaching of writing: sentences first,
paragraphs next, then a five-paragraph theme, then a genuine
essay.

However, by using the concept of top down processing

in conjunction with bottom up processing (a dual focus which
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in itself more accurately reflects how humans process
language}, teachers of composition might significantly
improve student writing.

Further, by taking into account

top down and bottom up aspects of global coherence,
composition teachers might also complement recent
developments in learning theory which suggest that humans as
individuals have different cognitive styles, that some of us
begin a composition with "the big picture" and then "flesh
it out," while others begin with several small observations
and details and then build upon them until a coherent
composition emerges.
Composition teachers can also begin to treat the notion
of coherence more evenly if they look not just at the
surface language of a composition, but beneath it and beyond
it. Composition teachers must look beneath the surface
language to the underlying cognitive processes that all
humans share, and they must look beyond the surface language
of the composition to the overarching, powerful, and
ubiquitous influence contextual salience exerts in the
culture, and thus, in the compositions of students:
composition teachers simply cannot allow the surface
language of the composition to bear the entire burden of
coherence.

Lastly, composition teachers can begin to treat

the notion of coherence more evenly if they draw more and
more from what is offered to them by those in their
collateral disciplines, for the study of language, and by
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extension, the study of the global coherence of a
composition, subsumes a multitude of disciplines and is not,
as once was thought, solely relegated to "the Department of
English."

Three Lines of Inquiry
How best, then, can composition teachers make certain
they do not assume that the global coherence of a
composition is an a priori condition?

How best can

composition teachers broaden their focus with regard to the
various aspects of global coherence so that they carefully
examine not only the surface language of a composition, but
also the cognitive relationships which underlie the surface
language, as well as the contextually salient aspects which
overarch the surface language?

Finally, how best can

composition teachers utilize appropriate concepts from
collateral disciplines?
In order to make certain that they do not assume that
the global coherence of a composition is a priori,
composition teachers need an approach which is sufficiently
complex to remind them constantly that the cohering aspects
of a composition cannot be taken for granted, but instead
demand active cognitive and linguistic skills.

This

approach, however, ought not be so complex that composition
teachers lose sight of the comprehensive, global nature
required of a successful composition.

In order to examine
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carefully not only the surface language of a composition,
but also the cognitive relationships which underlie the
surface language, as well as the contextually salient
aspects which overarch the surface language, composition
teachers need an approach which assures balanced and
consistent attention to all these aspects as they
co-function to enable global coherence.

In order best to

use collateral disciplines, composition teachers need an
approach which inherently surveys and filters these
disciplines for relevant concepts.

Numerous works within

and outside the discipline of rhetoric and composition which
deal with cohesion, coherence, and related concepts suggest
that such an approach consists of three "global categories."
These three global categories represent three major
perspectives of coherence that, for the purposes of this
study, I categorize as the linguistic, the cognitive, and
the contextually salient perspectives.

The Linguistic Perspective
The linguistic perspective deals with those aspects of
global coherence manifested the most frequently and often
the most explicitly in a text; such aspects are manifested
through and by a text's own language in words meant to be
understood at the literal level.

Such cohesive language

often consists of frequently used words infrequently
associated with coherence, such as the, she, it, so, and do.
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Characteristic of the linguistic perspective is Halliday and
Hasan's Cohesion in English, which posits five cohering,
"non-structural components of the semantic system" of
English: reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and
lexical cohesion (29).

Halliday and Hasan argue that these

components figure centrally in the coherence of a text.
In treating the following passage from Alice in
Wonderland, Halliday and Hasan identify the components of
reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical
cohesion as they function to cohere the passage:
[1:5a]

The Cat only grinned when it saw Alice.
"Come, it's pleased so far," thought Alice, and
she went on.
"Would you tell me, please, which way I
ought to go from here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to
get to," said the Cat.
"I don't much care where--" said Alice.
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said
the Cat.
"--so long as I get somewhere" Alice added as
an explanation.
"Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if
you only walk long enough."
(in Halliday & Hasan 30)

Working from the last lines to the first, Halliday and
Hasan argue that "do that" SUBSTITUTES for "get somewhere,"
which is tied through LEXICAL COHESION to "where you want to
get to," which is related also through LEXICAL COHESION to
"which way I ought to go."

"Oh" serves as a CONJUNCTION for

"--so long as I get somewhere" and "you're sure to do that,"
and "then" also serves as a CONJUNCTION as it coheres "I
don't much care where--" to
way you go."

It • • •

it doesn't matter which

In Alice's second utterance, ELLIPSIS coheres
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"where" with the Cat's second utterance " . . . where you
want to get to," and LEXICAL COHESION ties Alice's "care"
with the Cat's "want."

REFERENCE ties "that" in the Cat's

first utterance to Alice's question ".

which way I ought

to go," and, again, REFERENCE ties "it" of Alice's interior
monologue to "The Cat" in the first line of the passage.
Throughout the passage, from its beginning to its end,
REPETITION ties "Alice" and "the Cat" into a "cohesive
chain" (30).
If, in the illustration on the following page, brackets
enclose the words in the passage which cohere through ties
and ALL-CAPITALS denote the words which tie (the
conjunctions, at least in this passage), and lines of
coherence are drawn connecting the elements of each cohesive
tie, the manner in which this passage is bound together
begins to take shape.

The elements of coherence in this or

any passage effect lines of coherence which exert a binding
and unifying force not only between themselves, but also on
much of the content within them or near the lines of
coherence.
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1
(l:Sb]

~

(The Cat] only
__________________

grinned
when (it]
saw [Alice].
________________
J

~

"Come,
(Alice],

l~~

(it] I s pleased so far," thought

and she went on.

I

"Would you tell me,

you

I

"(I don't much care [where]]--" said

I

I

(Alice].

I

"THEN [it doesn't matter which way you
I

go],"

said [the Cat].
"--(so long as I

,

.r---~

(get somewhere]]" [Alice]

added as an explanation.
"OH, you're sure to (do that]," said (the
I

Cat], if you only walk long enough."
Thus Halliday and Hasan's approach begins to shed light
on the linguistic aspects of global coherence, but the
analysis of the sample passage also raises questions.

For

example, pronouns sUbstitute for Alice or the Cat ten times,
and it sUbstitutes once for an entire clause ("I don't much
care where [I get to].") Are these prono:uns, which serve as
substitutes for Alice or the Cat, and which Halliday and
Hasan do not note, a part of the "cohesive chain"
represented by the repetition of Alice or the Cat?
One might observe, too, that repetition is not included
among Halliday and Hasan's five elements of cohesion, yet it
serves a consistent cohesive function throughout the
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passage.

Is repetition considered an element of cohesion?

If so, is it also "non-structural"?
"structural"?

If not, is it

What are the criteria for determining if a

cohesive element is "non-structural" or "structural"?
Interestingly, of Halliday and Hasan's five sub-categories
of cohesion,

(or six, if one counts repetition), only

one--conjunction--has words in the text which actually tie,
i.e., THEN and OH, while the remaining sub-categories of
cohesion do not act as ties, but instead effect coherence by
representing a cohesive tie brought about by a structural
operation (i.e., substitution, ellipsis, and co-reference),
or by a semantic relation (i.e., lexical cohesion, and
possibly, repetition.)

will this observation hold as one

analyzes additional texts?

If so, how will this affect the

classification of cohesive categories?

Yet another question

is what do Halliday and Hasan mean by "reference," since
reference is a feature of any symbol, word, phrase, or
clause?

Perhaps more importantly at this juncture in this

study of global coherence is, what are the criteria that
determine if an element functions in the linguistic,
cognitive, or contextually salient global categories?

These

and other questions are addressed in chapters two, three,
and four of this study.

The Cognitive Perspective
Whereas aspects of the linguistic perspective are
frequently and most explicitly manifested in a composition,
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the aspects of the second perspective of global coherence,
the cognitive perspective, are often manifested in a liminal
manner and serve as a threshold at which distinction between
the explicit and implicit blurs.

However, the essential

bridging effect of these aspects is present in every text.
The cognitive perspective is exemplified through such
concepts as central cognitive processes, natural semantic
domains (i.e., those domains which are not socially
constructed but which occur in nature, such as a taxonomy in
biology), Gestalt, and the relationship between given and
new information.

One example from the cognitive perspective

is the following text of a very familiar routine:
(text #1) You wake up. You get out of bed. You go to the
bathroom. You put on your clothes. You eat.
You go to work.
(text #2) First, you wake up. Then, you get out of bed.
Next, you go to the bathroom. After that, you
put on your clothes. Then, you eat. Next, you
go to work.
(text #3) You go to the bathroom. You get out of bed.
You eat. You wake up. You go to work. You put
on your clothes.
(text #4) First, you go to the bathroom. Then, you get
out of bed. Next, you eat. After that, you
wake up. Then, you go to work .. Next, you put
on your clothes.
Members of most cultures or nationalities would find
texts #1 and #2 globally coherent; it is also quite likely
that these same persons would have great difficulty in
finding text #3 or #4 globally coherent.

Text #2 is

globally coherent, and one might posit that such coherence
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is effected by the logical connectors first, then, next, and
after that.

However, one might argue that text #1 is also

globally coherent, without explicit logical connectors such
as first, then, next, and after that.

(An additional

argument can also be made: the explicit logical connectors
in text #4 do not render the text globally coherent.) How
then can text #1 be judged globally coherent?
One response might be that the actions described in
text #1 are so familiar as to be almost universal, and
indeed that is so. Following this line of argument, text #1
is globally coherent without the explicit logical connectors
employed in text #2 because the actions in text #1 are
virtually universal for all humans.

However, the actions in

text #3 are the very same actions as those in text #1, but
text #3 is not globally coherent.

Only the sequence of

actions is different, and therein lies the key to the global
coherence of text #1 and text #2: the SEQUENCE of the
actions, i.e., a sequence in time and space that one has
corne to regard as logical, and not the actions alone, allow
for the global coherence of the text.

Such a sequence is an

example of one of at least fifteen central cognitive
processes; other central cognitive processes include but are
not limited to contrast, spatializing, comparing, positing
causes and/or effects, and classification, and are used to
process information, are interconnected, and are sensitive
to one's belief system (Fodor 104).

Central cognitive
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processes, together with cognitive aspects such as Gestalt
and the given/new relationship, form a significant part of
the cognitive perspective of global coherence and will be
treated in greater detail in chapter three of this study.

The Contextually Salient Perspective
The third perspective of global coherence, that of
contextual salience, is usually manifested in the text
through such implied but powerful, fundamental, and
culturally-related concepts as epistemological frames,
central metaphors, sociological models, and warrants.

The

following example illustrates how contextual salience, or,
in this case, subcultural salience, dramatically affects
global coherence through the lexicon:
When the tool locates the object, he may name that
location to the stalls, saying in an undertone "left
bridge" or "right bridge" or "kiss the dog," or
whatever instructions may be necessary to inform the
stalls, so that they can put the patient into position
for the tool to operate. The tool may likewise
communicate with the stalls during the operation,
giving them instructions such as "roust" or "come
through," or "stick," or "stick and split me out" or
"turn him for a pit," etc. All tools give the stalls
an office or signal when they remove the object. . . .
To this researcher "it seems incredible" that the
patient does not realize that the language is focused
almost exclusively on him.
(adapted from Maurer 53-54)
Here is evinced one prominent part of the context, the
subculture, implicit and not mentioned in the text, but
which makes salient a specific semantic domain and manifests
explicitly in the text a specialized vocabulary.

Such

specialized vocabulary is an essential element of the global
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coherence of this particular text, and the explicit-implicit
relationship between specialized vocabulary representing
semantic domains and the subculture also holds for entire
texts written across the curriculum, whether in business,
law, science, technology, or the arts.
The earlier passage from Alice in Wonderland indicates
that the linguistic elements of global coherence are the
elements used the most frequently and the most explicitly.
Similarly, the passage describing the early morning routine
and its sequence of familiar actions illustrates how the
cognitive elements of global coherence serve bridging or
liminal functions, at times explicit and at times implicit.
In like manner, the above passage using the argot of
pickpockets illustrates that the elements of the
contextually salient perspective rely on culturally-related
concepts such as epistemological frames, central metaphors,
sociological metaphors, and warrants.
Because the contextually salient perspective of global
coherence is culturally related, it often seems to be
omnipresent and ubiquitous.

Paradoxically, the contextually

salient perspective is often the most implicit aspect of
global coherence, never manifesting itself explicitly or
directly, but instead, manifesting itself implicitly in the
form of epistemological frames, central metaphors,
sociological metaphors, and warrants. Nor is the
contextually salient perspective manifested in language
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meant to be understood at the literal level, as in the
linguistic and cognitive global categories, but in language
meant to be understood at the interpretive level in the form
of such key components of a composition as word choice,
grammatical structure (voice, nominalizations, etc.),
rhetorical pattern of sentences, thesis placement, and
prevalence of particular central cognitive processes (often
resulting in emphasis on a particular arrangement or pattern
of thought).

These and other aspects of contextual salience

are treated in greater detail in chapter four of this study.

Summary of the Study
Those scholars operating from a linguistic perspective
(e.g., Halliday & Hasan, Gutwinski, and Markels) seem to
emphasize aspects of global coherence which are more
explicit in a composition; such aspects might best be
studied from the vantage points of descriptive or text
linguistics.
Those scholars operating from a cognitive perspective
(e.g., Winterowd, Bruner, and Fodor) seem to emphasize
aspects liminal in nature, at times manifested explicitly in
a text, and at times not, but whose bridging effect is
present in every text; such aspects might best be studied
from the vantage points of language and cognition, cognitive
science, and cognitive psychology.
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Those scholars operating from a perspective of
contextual salience (e.g., Hirsch, st. Clair, and Toulmin)
seem to emphasize what are often manifestations of very
implicit aspects of global coherence; such aspects might
best be studied from the vantage points of sociolinguistics,
sociology, and ethnology.
The purposes in this study, then, are twofold:
First, I seek to show that virtually all
significant aspects of coherence are usefully
understood as falling within three global categories:
linguistic, cognitive, and contextually salient. This
approach achieves several ends:
a) it provides a manageable framework for the
analysis of global coherence
b) it redistributes the burden of global coherence
from the traditional focus on the surface
language of the composition to a tripartite focus
which includes not only the surface language of
the composition, but also the global factors
beneath the surface language and those which
function beyond the surface language
c) it draws from the disciplines of psychology and
sociolinguistics to validate the cognitive and
contextually salient aspects of global coherence
d) elements of global coherence may be identified
and assigned to either the linguistic, cognitive,
or contextually salient categories; these
elements are then located on a continuum in terms
of their explicitness or implicitness
e) it offers insight into how a-c above will assist
the teacher of composition in further
understanding global coherence, and consequently,
assist in the teaching of student writers as they
wrestle with expressing themselves and the worlds
about them in Edited American English
f) a visual metaphor will be offered, illustrating
what Longinus alluded to: "the whole texture of
the composition" formed by the "mutual
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combination" of "the most important elements"
into "what may be called one body" (69).
The second purpose of these study is to raise
implications for teaching composition.
This study of global coherence is inherently
interdisciplinary.

In order to study the comprehensive,

systematic connection of constitutive elements of a
composition or essay, with a consistent emphasis on both the
totality of the text and on the interrelatedness of its
constituents, I will draw from classical rhetoric, text
linguistics, descriptive linguistics, sociology,
anthropology, ethnology, language and cognition, cognitive
psychology, and cognitive science.
In addition, such an approach to global coherence may
involve a significant amount of re-shuffling of factors
traditionally viewed as linguistic or even textual.

For

example, subordinate conjunctions such as therefore and thus
have traditionally been viewed as linguistic, but therefore
and thus actually represent one of at least sixteen central
cognitive processes, that of positing causes or effects, and
from the view of the composition teacher or student, the
best use and cohering qualities of words such as therefore
or thus might be better grasped if they are treated from the
cognitive perspective.

Regarding the contextually salient

perspective, the re-shuffling of global coherence factors
might be seen in the weighing of some extra-textual features
on an equal (or more-than-equal) basis when compared to
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textual features.

For example, one might weigh the central

metaphor dominating a student writer's perspective more than
one would weigh his or her choice of prevalent central
cognitive processes because the central metaphor might
influence not only word choice, but also tone and voice, as
well as arrangement.
In an effort to articulate the elements of global
coherence and investigate the explicit/implicit dynamic of
these elements within a text, I will turn initially to the
linguistic perspective, for that has been the traditional
perspective from which coherence in the field of composition
has been viewed.

By reviewing three major works treating

cohesion and coherence, I will seek to identify along an
explicit-implicit continuum a common set of linguistic
elements that fundamentally contributes to the global
coherence of a text.

These linguistic elements are

manifested frequently and quite explicitly through and by a
text's own language, in words meant to be understood at the
literal level of language.

such words serve not only as

content words or function words, but also as ties for
coherence.
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CHAPTER II
THE LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE
This chapter consists of three sections.

The first

section, an overview of the linguistic perspective, draws
upon three major works treating cohesion and coherence in
order to identify linguistic elements of global coherence.
The second section develops, in effect, a handlist of
linguistic elements of global coherence.

The third section

of the chapter relates these elements to an explicitimplicit continuum as it functions to enable global
coherence in compositions and essays.

Overview of the Linguistic Perspective
Several motives drive the investigation of global
coherence from a linguistic perspective.

One motive is that

the structural operations which enable cohesive ties are
manifested in the surface language of a text very frequently
and very explicitly.

Unlike the cohesive ties we will

encounter in the cognitive and culturally salient
perspectives of global coherence, whose explicit presence in
the surface language of a text is often optional or are not
even alluded to in the text of a composition, every
structural operation which enables a cohesive tie must be
explicitly represented in the surface language of a text by
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overt markers (or by the zero marker in the case of
elliptical constructions).

In short, for every structural

operation enabling a cohesive tie in a text, one will find a
specific word or group of words in the text whose primary
function is not content, but coherence.
Moreover, because markers of these structural
operations, along with additional markers of coherence such
as subordinators and coordinators at the clause and
paragraph levels, appear the most frequently and the most
explicitly in the surface language of a text, they are the
most easily identified.

Given the tendency in this century,

at least in America if not in western Europe, towards the
analytic rather than the holistic, and the concomitant
impetus to quantify data, scholars such as M. A. K. Halliday
and Ruquaiya Hasan have focused on the highly frequent and
explicit surface-language markers which denote the
underlying, cohering structural operations of a text.
Further, it must be added, this focus has been
predominantly on cohesive ties at the sentence or clause
level as the ties themselves function at the sentence level,
within a paragraph, across paragraphs, or throughout an
entire text or composition.

Such primacy of the sentence

level has been disputed and called a fundamental error in
compositional theory.

Robert de Beaugrande, for example,

argues that the sentence is not "the primary unit of speech
production and comprehension," and cites several scholars to
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bolster his position (Ohmann; Bever, Lackner, & Kirk;
Levelt).

However, de Beaugrande's argument rests on the

premise that if the sentence is not the primary unit in
producing speech, then the sentence is also not the primary
unit in producing a written text, but this argument does not
hold, for writing is not speech written down.
To be sure, both speech and writing use symbols
systematically, but they operate in significantly different
contents.

Normal, unrehearsed speech assumes, among other

things, immediate audience response in kind, the complement
of prosodic features, and the complement of gestures, all
constrained by the working memory's limits of text length
and complexity.

Consequently, a transcript of a spoken

dialog often reveals an uneven progression toward the
dialog's goal, with the progression characterized by
frequent fits and starts, of numerous stops and returns to
the last, mutually understood point the parties of the
dialog share.

Such a progression is not smooth, and

although produced linearly, i.e., through the speech stream,
the progression is not linear.
Writing, on the other hand, subsumes all of the above
characteristics of speech production as the writer engages
in an inner dialog with self or with cohorts in an attempt
to produce a written text, but the act of producing a
composition transcends the essential and subtended
characteristics of speech production because a written
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composition operates in a significantly different context
than does speech; the context of the written composition
cannot assume immediate audience response, prosodic
features, or physical gestures, nor is the working memory as
constrained as in speech processing; additionally, the
composition, in order to be successful, must exhibit a
smooth progression of thought, and do so within the
parameters of punctuated linearity.
In order for the composition to do this, certain
discrete units, with cognitive boundaries, are necessary,
without which punctuated linearity gives way to
undifferentiated linearity, to a gigantic run-on of notions
and concepts which has only a faint semblance of
connectivity and which fails utterly to cohere in a global
manner.

Thus, the written text must have a basic

constituent which enables its linearity to be punctuated
consistently according to appropriate cognitive boundaries.
This smallest constituent manifests coherence through
subject-predicate relations, to use the traditional terms,
or through the given-new relationship, to use more recent,
cognitive terms.

This "smallest" constituent is the clause.

It is both natural and logical for scholars interested
in coherence from the linguistic perspective to focus
predominantly on cohesive ties at the clause level as the
ties themselves function within a sentence, within a
paragraph, across paragraphs, or throughout an entire text
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or composition.

In point of fact, this "smallest"

constituent is incredibly complex, its study having spawned
entire theoretical grammars in linguistics, such as
transformational-generative grammar, and detailed
pedagogical approaches in composition, such as sentence
combining.
Despite this focus on the clause, we will not follow
the Katz-Fodor argument that discourse, or in our case, a
composition or essay, consists basically of an extended and
conjoined sentence.

Rather, our approach to the elements of

global coherence will follow more inclusive arguments such
as those advanced by members of the Prague School, Kenneth
Pike, William Labov, Dell Hymes, and others: expressed
language can be fully understood only when seen as a human
action taken within a sUbsuming context with both explicit
and implicit elements contributing to the coherence of the
linguistic expression.

Or, as Stephen Witte and Lester

Faigley write from a more recent and more rhetorical
perspective, "coherence defines those underlying semantic
relations that allow a text to be understood" and that
"coherence conditions are governed by the writer's purpose,
the audience's knowledge and expectations, and the
information to be conveyed," among other things (202).
Of all the reasons which motivate scholars to
investigate global coherence from a linguistic perspective,
perhaps the principal reason is a fascination with language,
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and the marvelous, but often taken-for-granted feat of
learning a language.

Because of the time and complexity

required in learning a first language, Nature has endowed
humans with an extended neoteny--the most extended of all
mammals--to enable them to learn, among other things, this
complicated thing called language.

Amazingly, humans do so

at such a young age that most of them take language for
granted and do not even remember learning it.

By the age of

five or so, humans have acquired a fairly complete grammar,
as well as a working vocabulary of several thousand words,
all subject to an infinite number of structural combinations
in various contexts and for various purposes.

Remarkably,

also by this early age, these phenomenal feats of language
production and comprehension have become automatic within
humans, so much so that they think it as natural to use
language as it is to eat and breathe.

Because it is so

natural and automatic, it often seems that to talk is to
think, to think is to talk, such that one's inner thoughts
and one's "outer speech" are one and the same, but they are
not.

Ideas, visualizations, and internal cognitive

paradigms are not necessarily conceived or "instantiated
internally" in linear fashion, yet all speech, and
consequently, all writing, must comply with the
physiological constraint of linearity.
Linearity accounts for much of the difficulty linguists
have had in dealing with semantics and global coherence.
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Traditionally, linguistics was limited to spoken language
and to the sentence level, both of which are linear (and
written language is even more constrained by linearity than
is spoken language); however, semantics and global coherence
are not limited to linearity, and trying to treat semantics
or global coherence through linearity alone is like trying
to define a cube using only the dimension of length without
using the dimensions of height and width, or like trying to
fully experience a circus while holding one's nose and
plugging one's ears.

This factor of linearity is the single

most distinguishing characteristic between language and
cognition.
Fascination with language has also led linguists to
investigate the connection between language and thought.
One position regarding this connection is that the dynamics
of human thought are universal for all humans the world
over, yet much of the linguistic aspect of human
communications is not universal, but instead, particular for
a specific language.
If one follows the line of thinking represented by the
speculative grammarians of the 1200s, by the Port Royal
grammarians of the 1600s, and by the "cartesian linguists"
of today, one can posit the following key tenets:
1) underlying all languages, i.e., underlying
language as sui generis, is a set of cognitive
universals which in humans are "hard-wired," i.
e., physiologically determined; these cognitive
universals may be logically prior to linguistic
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universals (this position is articulated in
chapter three)
2) because linguistic complexity above the
level of the sign develops pari passu with
cognitive complexity, linguistic universals have
much in common with cognitive universals; thus,
these sui generis features of language are best
studied from the cognitive perspective of global
coherence, not the linguistic perspective
3) differences in languages are principally
surface differences, and these differences
manifest themselves in particular grammatical
features of particular languages; in this study,
such features are called sui species features and
are best studied from the linguistic perspective
of global coherence; hence, the term linguistic
refers to these sui species features.
When one distinguishes cognitive universals and
linguistic particulars, one sees that language as sui

generis is a symbol system which functions in key ways to
enable humans to form coherent views of that which is real
in their past and present, and of that which may be possible
in their future--indeed, this symbol system enables
higher-order thinking itself.

This symbol system which

comprises language as sui generis performs several
functions, the foremost of which is reference, for it is
through the symbolic function of reference that humans can
"establish the temporal and logical priority of empirical
reference as the original bond between external fact and
conceptual thought"; all other uses of language derive from
and depend on this "fundamental semantic link" (Waldron
xix) .
The distinction between cognitive universals and
linguistic particulars also allows one to note that the
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systematicity of language as a sui species enables humans to
categorize linguistic operations peculiar to a particular
language, whether the operations are primarily inflections
in a language such as Russian, or primarily syntactic in a
language such as English.

The systematicity of English, an

analytic language, allows one to identify structural
operations which enable cohesive ties at various levels in a
composition: between juxtaposed clauses, across
non-juxtaposed clauses, between juxtaposed paragraphs, and
across non-juxtaposed paragraphs.

Such cohering structural

operations in English include substitution, ellipsis, and
co-reference.
An approach based on the distinction between cognitive
universals and linguistic particulars not only reflects
psychological research indicating cell specialization in the
cerebral cortex, but for the teacher of composition, this
distinction, in combination with the notion of contextually
salient features, also re-distributes the burden of
communication from what has been the sole traditional
carrier, the surface language of the text, to the three
global factors represented by the linguistic, cognitive, and
contextually salient perspectives.

Significantly, this

approach also concerns itself with the feature of linearity,
for the linguistic perspective is the only perspective
operating under this constraint, and since it is the most
explicit perspective and, indeed, the one through which the
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other two perspectives are related, the composition teacher
must be particularly mindful of linearity.

Consequently, he

or she must also pay especial attention to directionality
and how it relates to the nucleus of natural-language logic,
a nucleus consisting of reference and logical identity;
these concepts are discussed in the context of Halliday and
Hasan's work on cohesion.
What follows is a survey of three major works which
treat elements of global coherence from a linguistic
perspective: M. A. K. Halliday and Ruquaiya Hasan's Cohesion
in English, Waldemar Gutwinski's Cohesion in Literary Texts,

and Robin Markels' A New Perspective in Cohesion in
Expository Paragraphs.

The survey ends with the

identification of elements of global coherence from the
linguistic perspective and their placement along an
explicit-implicit continuum.

Halliday and Hasan
Halliday and Hasan's Cohesion in English is the single
most cited work on the topic of cohesion.

Scholars such as

Waldemar Gutwinski even regard Halliday and Hasan's
treatment of cohesion as the ultimate position on textual
cohesion, but this position may well be like that of such
linguists as Leonard Bloomfield, Charles Fries, and other
structuralists who believed the study of language had
reached its zenith in the late 1950s when methods of
linguistic analysis enabled the "complete description of all
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linguistic analysis enabled the "complete description of all
human languages."

Studies in neuro-, psycho-, and

sociolinguistics now indicate the fallacy of this position.
Nonetheless, Halliday and Hasan's treatment of cohesion in
English merits attention, for it deals intricately with the
most explicit and most frequently used elements of global
coherence.
Halliday and Hasan's method of textual analysis, is, in
their words, a "way to offer an insight into what it is that
makes a text a text" (328), and to do so they place cohesion
within a "description of English," with the sentence as the
"highest structural unit in their grammar" (28).

Linguistic

structures are limited to four "ranks": clause, verbal
group, nominal group, and adverbial group.

Despite these

limits, however, Halliday and Hasan investigate the
"linguistic means whereby a text is enabled to function as a
single meaningful unit" (29-30).

Further, a "text" exhibits

"texture" when it "functions as a unity with respect to its
environments" (2).

According to Halliday and Hasan,

texture, or global coherence,
is achieved through the mutually complementary relationship
of "register" and "cohesion" (23).
Register is "the set of meanings, the configuration of
semantic patterns, that are typically drawn upon under the
specified conditions, along with the words and structures
that are used in the realization of the meanings" (23).

43

Two distinctions need to be made at this point, one
concerning Halliday and Hasan's meaning of the word
reference, the other concerning their dichotomy between the
structural and the non-structural.

Reference and logical

identity form the nucleus of natural-language logic.
Reference is the most fundamental property of language, the
simple but absolutely essential characteristic enabling the
link between linguistic symbol and the thing referred to.
However, this fundamental meaning of reference is not what
is meant by Halliday and Hasan.

Rather, they use the word

reference to mean co-reference, i.e., two or more words
having the same referent.

In this study, the word reference

carries its fundamental meaning, and the word co-reference
is used wherever Halliday and Hasan have used the word
reference.
The distinction between "structural" and
"non-structural" cohesion is crucial.

For Halliday and

Hasan, cohesion is a process in which the relation between
two items in a text is enabled, and thus the sub-divisions
of cohesion--reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction,
and lexical cohesion--are also relational, and hence,
"non-structural," as opposed to "structural."

However, one

might argue that Halliday and Hasan operate from a
perspective which splits form and meaning by positing this
kind of structural/non-structural distinction.

The

structural category of the semantic system, according to
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Halliday and Hasan, consists of the following components:
clause group (theme), verbal group (voice), nominal group
(deixis), adverbial group (conjunction), and information
unit (information distribution or focus); the non-structural
category consists solely of cohesion (reference,
substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical cohesion).
However, these five sub-categories of cohesion are
structural in nature because co-reference is a form of
substitution, as is ellipsis.

Indeed, Wolfgang Dressler

argues that "conditions triggering explicit and elliptic
anaphoric transformations . . . are often similar," so
similar that he posits, citing various scholars (Lakoff,
Green, Dougherty, and Steinitz) a universal condition for
both explicit and implicit (elliptical) anaphoric
transformations: "recoverability or possibility of
substitution," and that this is "true for deletion and
anaphoric pronouns such as 'he, she, it' or pseudopronominal nouns" (205).
Further, as one will see in chapter three, conjunction
is inextricably bound to structure, for it is the role of
conjunctions to indicate not only the basic temporal-spatial
relationships of thought, but also the complex logical
structures of the central cognitive processes.
Lastly, lexical cohesion is, as Halliday and Hasan
maintain, non-structural in the sense that the ties enabling
lexical cohesion are "associative" in nature (De Saussure
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123, 125-27); these associational ties relate to semantic
domains, which are integral to the cognitive and
contextually salient perspectives of global coherence
addressed later in this study.

Lexical cohesion is,

however, structural in the sense that the meanings
represented by the vocabulary of any semantic domain are wed
to forms which, although arbitrary as Ferdinand de Saussure
noted, are forms nonetheless.
Thus, the structural vs. non-structural dichotomy is an
unneeded dichotomy and is founded on the flawed assumption
that form (structure) can be separated from meaning.

Form

and meaning can no more be separated than can language from
the development of higher-order thought; the relationship of
each pair is pari passu.

Halliday and Hasan make a valuable

contribution to the linguistic perspective of global
coherence by their delineation and examination of such
cohering operations as co-reference, substitution, ellipsis,
conjunction, and lexical cohesion; this study, however,
argues that co-reference and ellipsis are forms of
substitution, and that substitution is structural in nature,
being achieved through structural operations in English as
shown by transformational-generative grammar, and that these
structural operations enable cohesive ties which, with few
exceptions, are explicitly represented in the surface
language of a text by overt markers.

(Detailed support of

this argument, which refutes Halliday and Hasan's position
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that co-reference, substitution, and ellipsis are
non-structural, is found in Appendix I of this study.)
Whether co-reference, ellipsis, and sUbstitution are
structural or non-structural, correct sUbstitution is
essential not only for the sake of variety, but more
importantly for logical identity, which, along with symbolic
reference, constitutes the nucleus of natural language
logic.

This nucleus is encompassed by the linguistic,

cognitive, and contextually salient perspectives as the
visual metaphor in chapter five illustrates.
Moreover, it is argued that conjunction is better
examined in the cognitive perspective of global coherence
because it is indicative of underlying, basic, and complex
cognitive processes.

Lastly, it is argued that lexical

cohesion subdivides into two categories, natural and
synthetic semantic domains, with natural domains better
examined from the cognitive perspective because they are
products of evolved cognitive processes, and synthetic
domains better examined from the contextually salient
perspective because they are determined by cultural forces.
In sum, though Halliday and Hasan nominally reject any
extra-textual considerations of global coherence, their
focus on such sui species features of a text's surface
language as co-reference, anaphora, cataphora, and ellipsis
is apropos this investigation of the linguistic perspective
of global coherence.

Moreover, Cohesion in English offers
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valuable insight into how structural operations, especially
those involving sUbstitution of pro-forms or the zero
element, comprise the lion's share of the cohesive elements
in the linguistic perspective of global coherence.

Gutwinski
Waldemar Gutwinski's Cohesion in Literary Texts,
published in the same year as Halliday and Hasan's Cohesion
in English and drawing from Halliday and Hasan's earlier
publications (Halliday 1962, 1964, 1972; Hasan 1964, 1967,
1968), posits a theoretical framework quite similar to that
of Halliday and Hasan in terms of cohesive elements.

As the

title indicates, Gutwinski focuses on works in belles
lettres, and he analyzes passages by Ernest Hemingway and
Henry James.
One should note at the outset that although Gutwinski
touches on research concerning coherence, he believes
coherence to be unanalyzable in the linguistic sense because
it deals with phenomena which "cannot be treated on a single
level of analysis and some of which are not open to
linguistic analysis at all"

(26).

These latter "phenomena"

are things such as "gaps in thought," which Gutwinski
illustrates with a brief passage from a freshman composition
text, Writing with a Purpose, in which the author, James
Mccrimmon, advises student writers to avoid "gaps in
thought" if they wish to write a coherent paragraph.

Thus,
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Gutwinski tells us, the term coherence is "carefully
avoided" in his study (27).
Gutwinski states that none of the "several competing
theories of language organization [the extended standard
theory of generative transformational grammar, generative
semantics, applicational-generative, tagmemic, systemic, and
stratificational grammar] . . . " have "developed a semology
or fully-worked out tactics for its upper stratum (lexical
hierarchy or lexis)" which "must be seen as an inadequacy if
any explicitness is attempted" (23).

This view

notwithstanding, Gutwinski uses stratificational theory as
his theoretical base because "it recognizes and develops
several strata, one of which is semology" (25); this
semology is defined as a system "behind" grammar that
consists of
meaning contrasts and patterns of sense
organization
. . . [which are] still very
poorly understood. Yet we suspect that the
relationship of semology to grammar is much the
same as that of grammar to phonology.
(Gleason qtd. in Gutwinski 39)
Gutwinski relates that most of the linguistic phenomena in
his study belong to the "grammatic stratum" (sic) of
stratificational grammar (25).

He thus proceeds to examine

"the cohesive relations obtaining between clauses and
sentences in some selected literary prose texts," that is,
passages from James and Hemingway (26).
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Several "cohesive categories" are offered by Gutwinski
(54), the foremost of which is "the method of order" of
sentences (55).

He states:

The order in which clauses and sentences follow in
a text is, then, a cohesive factor which is always
present in the text and which in combination with
other cohesive factors--and sometimes even
alone--indicates what kind of cohesive relations
obtain among the sentence and clauses. . . • it
[order] will underlie implicitly correlations
involving all other cohesive factors studied here.
(Gutwinski 56)
Unfortunately, Gutwinski develops nothing further

vis-a-vis order and these "implicit correlations."

Instead,

he focuses on much the same sort of cohesive relations that
Halliday and Hasan do.

Gutwinski divides cohesive features

into two categories, grammatical and lexical.

The

grammatical category consists of anaphora/cataphora,
coordination/subordination, and enation/agnation; the
lexical category consists of repetition, occurrence of a
synonym or item "formed on same root," and occurrence of an
"item from same lexical set (co-occurrence group)" (57).
Gutwinski, drawing from Gleason, enlarges the "phoric"
category to include not only anaphora and cataphora, but
also homophora (reference to general or cultural knowledge,
e.g., "the army," "the queen," "the Superbowl"), exophora
(reference to "a situation outside of language," e.g., using
a gesture to supplement one's communication), and paraphora
(reference to something in another text, e.g., a line from
Shakespeare)

(66-68); however, Gutwinski's approach does not
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admit any reference other than anaphora or cataphora,
presumably for the same reasons he avoids all use of the
word coherence: such aspects, in his approach, are
non-linguistic.

Although Gutwinski admits only anaphora and

cataphora for his approach to cohesion, one can relate all
five kinds of "phoric" reference to the notion of linearity,
the significant constraint under which the linguistic
perspective must operate, but which the cognitive and
contextually salient perspectives are free of.
Both Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan give considerable
attention to anaphora and cataphora, with Gutwinski arguing
(60-61) that anaphora has traditionally received the most
attention of all cohesive features, with that attention
initially focused within clauses (Bloomfield), but that
later scholars have broadened the scope to include
inter-clausal cohesion (Gleason; Halliday & Hasan; Quirk,
Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik).

One might add that both

anaphora and cataphora adhere to the constraint of linearity
and are distinguished one from the other primarily in terms
of directionality.

Paraphora, too, is constrained by

linearity, but it is the linearity of another text, and thus
it is disallowed per Gutwinski's criteria.
that paraphora is a type of homophora.

One might argue

One can also note

that much of these two fundamental kinds of reference is not
constrained by linearity, and that they are within the
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bounds of the contextually salient perspective of global
coherence.
Again drawing from Gleason, Gutwinski illustrates
enation and agnation as grammatical features.

Enation, a

form of grammatical parallelism, is illustrated by the
following nursery rhyme:
[2:71] This
This
This
This

little
little
little
little

pig
pig
pig
pig

went to market
stayed home
had roast beef
had none. . . .

(76)

Agnation is "used for relations that are opposite and
complementary to enation" (78).

The following sentences

illustrate agnation:
[2:72] There was nothing left for her but to sell the
old family house. This she couldn't do.
This she couldn't do is an agnate structure which serves to
cohere the two sentences by reversing the SVo word order of
sell the old house.

However, one might also argue that

This, in conjunction with do, are sUbstitutes for sell the
old family house, and that This has been fronted through a
structural operation akin to the do-fronting transformation
in transformational-generative grammar, and that the
variation in word order is not as much for purposes of
cohesion as for stylistic emphasis.

One other example of

agnation is the following:
[2:73] James wrote this book.
This book was written by James.

(78)

Here one has an example of the active-passive
transformation.

The reason for the alternation between
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structures lies not so much in efforts to cohere a text via
structural operations as in the given/new relationship,
which, it will be argued in chapter three of this study, is
a fundamental part of the cognitive perspective of global
coherence.
In sum, Gutwinski offers two main categories, the
grammatical and the lexical, whose elements serve as overt
markers of cohesive ties and which are explicitly
represented in the surface language of a text.

The

grammatical category consists of anaphora/cataphora,
coordination/subordination, and enation/agnation: the
lexical category consists of repetition, occurrence of
synonyms, and co-occurrence of items from the same lexical
group.

Yet, as was argued earlier, coordination and

subordination might be better treated from the cognitive
perspective because of their close relationship to central
cognitive processes.

Enation, to the extent it is cohesive

rather than stylistic, might be better treated from the
contextually salient perspective since parallelism is one of
several cultural thought patterns that humans use to
structure their thought and text (Kaplan).

As stated

earlier, agnation might be better treated from the cognitive
perspective due to its representing the given/new
relationship.

Those cohesive ties represented by synonyms

and items from the same lexical group might best be treated
as part of natural or synthetic semantic domains, with the
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former viewed from the cognitive perspective and the latter
from the contextually salient perspective.

This leaves

repetition, anaphora, and cataphora; the latter two result
from structural operations as demonstrated by
transformational generative grammar, and are forms of
sUbstitution differing primarily in directionality.
Although Halliday and Hasan also mentioned repetition as a
cohesive operation, they did not elaborate on it or assign
it to a cohesive category other than to state that it is a
type of reiteration (Halliday & Hasan 278).
The review of Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan
indicates that the basic cohesive categories in the
linguistic perspective continue to emanate from the
fundamental structural operation of sUbstitution: for
Halliday and Hasan, the cohesive categories are
co-reference, ellipsis, and substitution, with co-reference
and ellipsis being types of substitution, and for Gutwinski,
the cohesive categories are anaphora, cataphora, and
repetition, with anaphora and cataphora kinds of
co-reference, and therefore examples of sUbstitution.
In addition to reinforcing the primacy of sUbstitution
as a cohesive tie in the linguistic perspective, Gutwinski
expands the notion of reference by drawing on Gleason's work
on "phoric" reference.

Gutwinski not only treats anaphoric

and cataphoric reference in relation to cohesion, but he
also treats homophoric, paraphoric, and exophoric reference.
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Although he does not admit the three as cohesive, our
approach to global coherence, consisting of not only the
linguistic perspective, but also the cognitive and
contextually salient perspectives, will admit these latter
three types of reference, and hence, they will be explored
in the respective chapters of this study.

Moreover,

Gutwinski's treatment of the various kinds of "phoric"
reference enables one to relate each to the notion of
linearity, which, as was noted earlier, is a significant
constraint for the linguistic perspective, but not for the
cognitive nor the contextually salient perspectives.

Markels
Markels' work, A New Perspective on Cohesion in
Expository Paragraphs, offers interesting points of

commonality and dissimilarity with respect to the works of
Gutwinski and of Halliday and Hasan.

Where Gutwinski

focuses on works of belles lettres and Halliday and Hasan
focus on dialog and narrative, as well as belles lettres,
Markels focuses on expository writing; where Gutwinski is
oriented toward the text as a whole and Halliday and Hasan
are oriented towards texts of various lengths exhibiting
various degrees of closure, Markels is oriented toward
paragraphs.

In addition, Markels does not offer an overall

framework for analyzing the elements of coherence as do
Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan.

In these ways, Markels'
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treatment of the linguistic aspect of global coherence
differs markedly from those of Gutwinski and Halliday and
Hasan.

These significant differences notwithstanding,

Markels finds common ground with both Gutwinski and Halliday
and Hasan in two key areas: 1) the essential roles of
substitution, ellipsis, and [co-]reference in cohering a
text; and, 2) the essential and subsuming role of repetition
in cohering a text.
central to Markels' approach is the notion of
recurrence; indeed, she argues that "Where a recurrence
chain exists, there is cohesion; without a chain,
no cohesion" (14).

[there is]

Although she does not cite Harris, it

would seem that Markels' notion of a recurrence chain is
quite similar to Harris' "equivalence chain" (6-29);
however, Harris explores the use of the equivalence chain
through various grammatical structures and lexical domains,
while Markels by-and-Iarge restricts her examination of
"recurrence chains" to the three structural operations of
substitution, ellipsis, and co-reference, all three of which
she states are "forms of partial repetition" (17).

One

should note, though, that although for Markels the notion of
recurrence is central to her approach, her view of
recurrence goes beyond the notion that it is simply
repetition, whether it is manifested through the structural
operations of substitution, ellipsis, or co-reference, or
whether it is "simply" the repeated use of the same word.
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For Markels, this expanded notion of recurrence comprises
the principal property of linguistic cohesion.

Markels

illustrates this centrality by using the following two
examples:
[2:74]
The opossum has survived in definitely
hostile surroundings for seventy million years.
The opossum is small; it can easily find a little
food, while big animals starve. The individual
opossum is not very delicate; it can stand severe
punishment.
It "plays 'possum" when it gets into
trouble.
It can go without food for a long time.
Many different things are food to an opossum.
Traits of the opossum have a high survival value.
The opossum is a survivor from the Age of
Reptiles.
(qtd. in Gorrell & Laird 125)
[2:75]
The reasons our opossum has survived in
definitely hostile surroundings for 70 million
years are evident. One is his small size: small
animals always find hiding places, they always
find a little food, where the big ones starve.
Another of its assets was its astounding
fecundity; if local catastrophes left only a few
survivors, it did not take long to reestablish a
thriving population. Also the individual opossum
is not exactly delicate: it can stand severe
punishment--during which it "plays 'possum" and
then scampers away--and it can go without food for
a considerable time.
Finally, a great many things
are "food" to an opossum. Each of these traits
has a high survival value, and their combination
has presented the United states with a survivor
from the Age of Reptiles.
(qtd. in Gorrell &
Laird 126)
In the first opossum text, the recurrence chain is
established through simple repetition of the word opossum;
in the second opossum text, the recurrence chain is
established not only by the word opossum, but also through
the structural operations of substitution, ellipsis, and
co-reference, and such structural operations, Markels
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argues, function in two important ways: 1) they "maintain an
unbroken chain of recurrences and thereby establish some
degree of cohesion through unity"; and 2) they "subordinate
information already known or recoverable by reducing the
autonomy of sentences containing that information and
forcing the reader back to preceding sentences for the
antecedents or other substitutions" (17).
To bolster her argument that repetition is central to
cohesion, Markels points out that in various
psycholinguistic studies concerned with thematization
(Perfetti & Goldman; Kintsch; Bransford & Franks; and
Crothers), the "shared constant" was repetition, except in
the work of Crothers, who concedes that lack of repetition
"probably explains his negative results" (38).

This,

Markels states, confirms her hypothesis that "cohesion
consists primarily of unity, the presence of a repeated
term" (38).
To demonstrate her approach, Markels analyzes two kinds
of paragraphs, single-term and multiple-chain.

Here one

examines her analysis of a single-term paragraph, i.e., a
paragraph whose cohesion is established through one
recurrence chain, as opposed to a multiple-chain paragraph
which may have a dominant recurrence chain and subordinant
recurrence chains.
Cohesion in the single-term paragraph occurs when "a
term achieves semantic dominance through repetition or
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equivalence" and "appears consistently in the subject or
dominant noun phrase position" (45), as in the "basic"
paragraph,
[2:76]
The Char-Bar is a bar on High street. The
Char-Bar swings. It permits dancing. The bar
specializes in foreign beers. The Char-Bar
attracts weirdos. It seats 198 people.
as opposed to the following set of sentences which possesses
a semantically dominant term, but not one that appears
consistently in the subject or dominant noun phrase
position:
[2:77]
Alfred likes peaches. Oregon doesn't grow
peaches. Peaches contain nitrogen. We have a
peach tree in our backyard. No one throws rotten
peaches at politicians or ball players. Cut five
peaches and sprinkle with sugar. Do you think
peach melba would be a good dessert?
Referring to example [2:77], Markels states that "once the
repeated term 'peaches' appears in the predicate position,
it forfeits the inherently limiting power of the subject
position and is itself 'subjected' to at least five other
topics: Alfred, Oregon, we, no one, you."

Markels continues

by observing that "cohesion requires the meshing of both
semantic and syntactic information and, at least for some
paragraphs . . . can be defined operationally" (44).
At this juncture, one certainly does not want to delve
into the sticky question concerning the exact nature of
semantics and syntax, but one might note that structure, as
opposed to syntax alone, occupies a prominent role in this
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study's three-pronged approach to global coherence, and that
structure in this study is confined neither to syntax nor to
the linguistic perspective.

Indeed, it is argued in

chapters three and four of this study that structure forms
an essential aspect of both the cognitive and contextually
salient perspectives of global coherence.

Having said this,

it can be pointed out that in example [2:77], more than
simply placing the word peach in the subject position of
each sentence would be required to cohere the collection of
sentences into a paragraph, as the "re-structuring" below
indicates:
[2:78]
Peaches are a favorite of Alfred's.
Peaches
don't grow in Oregon. A peach tree grows in our
backyard.
Peaches are not thrown at politicians
or ball players. Five peaches are cut and
sprinkled with sugar. Peach melba would be a good
dessert, don't you think?
Although the "Char-Bar" paragraph [2:76] will never win a
prize for style, it at least is cohesive, but even the
moving of the word peach to the subject position can not
salvage this poor collection of sentences.
Markels' assertion to the contrary, it would seem that
a cohesive paragraph subtends more than a meshing of
semantics and syntax; it is a meshing of more than these two
important elements, and chapters three and four will
illuminate, at least in part, other elements which serve to
provide a coherent text.

Perhaps part of the problem in
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Markels' semantics-syntax argument lies in two of her
premises.
The first premise is that English is "position
dependent on syntactic information" (45).

Markels does not

elaborate on what she means by syntactic information, and of
course, English is primarily an SVO language.

However, as

the wealth of sentence variety due to variation in word
order illustrates, English is not position dependent for
syntactic information, as examples [2:77] and [2:78] show.
The second premise is that a transformational analysis
can illustrate the semantics-syntax relationship by using
the TG concept of dominant sentence node when a collection
of sentences employs ellipsis in lieu of term repetition.
This premise overlooks the fundamental non-semantic nature
of TG sentence trees.

As Chomsky and others have repeatedly

shown, TG grammar was concerned with syntax, not semantics.
Too, a non-sensical sentence tree employing elliptical
constructions is easily generated because transformational
grammar deals with sentence structure, not sentence sense.
It is interesting to note that while Markels stresses
that her approach is "[h]eavily grounded in syntactic
analysis" (86) and places the burden of cohesion on "the
meshing of both semantic and syntactic information" (44),
thus confining the role of structure to syntactic structure,
she seems to anticipate cognitive and contextually salient
elements of global coherence, for she states that "[o]nly
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the concept of an a priori frame" composed of a world view
between the communicants can "explain language use" (33),
citing research which supports this view (Minsky; Schank &
Abelson; Rommetveit).

Such a reference to a priori frames

suggests the kind of "hard-wired" central cognitive
processes to be explored in chapter three of this study, and
the notion of world views, and concomitantly, extra-textual
elements, suggests the concepts of central metaphors and
epistemological frames which are treated in chapter four of
this study.

Likewise, Markels seems to anticipate

contextually salient elements of global coherence when she
reflects on the role sUbjective interpretation plays
whenever a person engages with a text.

She quotes Stephen

Tyler in his The Said and the Unsaid: Mind, Meaning, and
culture:
the "objective and universal character . . .
[of a text and its textuality] . . . can be
realized only through the sUbjectivity of some
reader, thus the burden of interpretation."
(378)
In sum, Markels does not offer an overall framework
which subsumes categories and elements of cohesion as do the
authors of the other two major works on cohesion, Gutwinski
and Halliday and Hasan; too, Markels' focus is primarily on
paragraphs, not on texts comprised of paragraphs.

One might

also disagree with her premises concerning the role of
syntax vis-a-vis cohesion in paragraphs.

Finally, Markels

does not explore the nature and various manifestations of
"phoric" reference as do Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan.
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Markels does, however, reiterate four aspects of cohesion
that both Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan find central to
coherence: repetition, and the structural operations of
substitution, ellipsis, and co-reference.

Finally, one may

observe that she, unlike Gutwinksi and Halliday and Hasan,
seems to allow for non-linguistic, i.e., non-textual,
elements in the global coherence of a text.

Linguistic Elements of Global Coherence
As noted earlier, the linguistic perspective deals with
those elements of global coherence manifested the most
frequently and often the most explicitly in a text; such
elements are manifested through and by a text's own language
in words meant to be understood at the literal level.

As a

review of Cohesion in English, Cohesion in Literary Texts,
and A New Perspective on Cohesion in Expository Paragraphs
indicates, these elements are indeed text-bound, and
therefore significantly constrained by linearity, hence the
emphases on anaphora, ellipsis, repetition, and cataphora by
Halliday and Hasan, Gutwinski, and Markels.

Our review of

the above-mentioned works also reveals that an additional
constraint operates in the linguistic perspective: the
constraint of co-reference.

Thus, one can make the

generalization that linguistic elements of global coherence
are meant to be understood at the literal level of language
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and are constrained by the properties of linearity and
co-reference.
When one determines to form a cohesive tie, whether
immediate, mediated, or remote (cf. Appendix I), one must
choose whether the tie will be explicit or have a
significant degree of implicitness.

If one chooses an

explicit tie, three options result: repetition of the
referent, an anaphoric pro-form co-referential with the
referent, or a cataphoric pro-form co-referential with the
referent.

If one chooses a tie with a significant degree of

implicitness, only one option exists: ellipsis, which,
though almost always anaphoric, is largely implicit in
nature because of its "zero component."
Thus, linguistic elements of global coherence are
represented by four categories: repetition, ellipsis,
anaphora, and cataphora.

Of these four categories, the

latter three are effected in the surface structure of a text
through structural operations of the sort illustrated by
transformational- generative grammar.

The remaining

category, repetition, is effected through duplication of the
referent.

The elements of repetition, i.e., the words used

to effect repetition, constitute an open set since it
consists of repetition of the referent, and the referent may
be represented by any number of constructions or word
classes.

The elements of ellipsis also constitute an open

set since its surface manifestations may be represented by
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any number of constructions and word classes.

The elements

of anaphora and the elements of cataphora constitute closed
sets, those of pro-forms, as indicated in the following
handlist.

Handlist of Linguistic Elements of Global Coherence
Repetition (open set)

duplication of the referent itself
Ellipsis (open set)

sUbstitution by the zero element of a portion of a parallel
and recoverable form
Anaphora (closed set)

above
The source for the above figures for the deficit is the
Congressional Office of the Budget.
aforementioned
The aforementioned plat is erroneous in both scale and
orientation.
the said
The said will be arraigned on Saturday at noon.

the aforesaid
The aforesaid is not the man we are after.

here
The Versailles Treaty is much too severe, and here the
Allied Powers err tragically.
there
The does frolicked in the meadow, and there the youth
photographed them.
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then
I opened the door casually; it was then that I realized
the room was decorated and all my friends were waiting
for me.
this
The hardliners underestimated Mr. Gorbachev, and this
was a mistake.
these
The student had split an infinitive and ended a
sentence with a preposition. The infuriated
teacher shouted "These are the kinds of errors
which I will not tolerate!"
that
As the young woman accepted the bouquet of flowers, she
smiled and said "That was a gracious gesture on your
part."
those
"Give me Socrates, Plato, and Zorba! Those are the
Greeks I am most interested in!"
the foregoing
No matter how you argue, the foregoing will need to be
notarized.
the preceding
The preceding was unnecessary propaganda.
already convinced.

Everyone is

the former/the latter
Sonny Liston and Muhammad Ali were two heavyweight
champions of the world. The former was an ex-con,
and the latter was an extra-good con.
the earlier
The cinema has two matinees on Sundays.
has seats for only one dollar.

The earlier
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the
A young man stood alone at the highest point of the
bridge. The young man was Stephen Daedelus.
the first (second, third,

. . . )

The first was the best.

the last
The last actually scored better because of the softened
playing field.

so + adjective/adverb
The theater was absolutely crowded.
so many people at this performance.

I did not expect

that + adjective/adverb
Rueckert broke the four-minute mark!
ran that fast!

I had no idea he

such + adjective + noun phrase
I love purple.

It is such a royal color.

one
Both students studied hard, but only one passed the
exam.
ones
Yes, I know there are all sorts of onions, but only the
ones from Valdalia are sweet enough to eat like an
apple.
he
John is a solid fellow; he is always honest and
considerate.
him
I liked George very much, but I could never understand
him.
his
I want to see Jeff's notes; his are easier to read.

67

she
My first Spanish teacher will always by my favorite,
for she is the one I married.
her
Sally dances wonderfully; I could have danced all night
with her.
hers
Let me see Cecilia's paintings; hers are always worth
buying.
it
Approving the budget will be difficult, but it is
vital.
its
Examine the dog's left-rear paw; its webbing has been
torn.
they
Mssrs. Reagan and Bush were both traditional
Republicans in that they relied heavily on defense
spending.
them
Your sister and your brother will be here for only two
more weeks. We must do our best to entertain them.
their
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky have passed on, but their
influence continues.
theirs
I have eaten my hamburger, but Sam and Dave have not;
theirs is on the stove.
same
Ellen wrote her first novel at age 26, and I did the
same.
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identical
The first superchip was manufactured in Silicon Valley,
but an identical one was soon manufactured in Hamburg.
so
Joanna hopes to be home for Christmas.

I hope so, too.

do
Democrats want the economy to improve; Republicans and
independents do, too.
do it
Jonathan doesn't care how long it takes him to secure
a good position. He just wants to do it.
do so
You want me to examine the tires, the carburetor, and
the brakes, and I will do so, but please let me eat
lunch first.
do that
The police officer asked me to get into his cruiser,
but I refused to do that.
do the same
Lyndon Johnson achieved a measure of domestic success,
and it is clear that Bill Clinton wants do the same.
be
We will be visiting Africa in 1999 for the entire
summer, and Mark and Carol also will be.
be it
Paco Sinmiedo will find his name in The Guinness Book
of Records, be it next year or the following one.
be so
Mother seems always to be tired, irritable, and sleepy.
I don't want her to be so.
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be that
She proposes to continue college after the birth of her
twins, be that feasible or not.
likewise
Lafayette was given honorary citizenship, and likewise,
Churchill.
not
He says that to juggle the accounts to achieve his
promotion is the surest and quickest way to advance in
the firm, but it is not.
which
I ran seven miles the day I decided to begin my diet,
which was not the prudent thing to do.
cataphora (closed set)

thusly
The Pruss ian drill instructor yelled "You will do
thusly!" Then, he demonstrated an about-face, followed
by the clicking of his heels.
thus
"It is thus," intoned the piano teacher, after which
his long, slender fingers nimbly scaled the notes.
here
Here is where you are wrong.
Inflation will not soar
out of control as long as the Federal Reserve maintains
tight control of the money supply.

it
It is wonderful to be independent.

this
This is what will happen next.
The lioness will
actually purr her way out of the fix she is in!

these
These are the latest photographs of Mars.
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as follows
The criteria are as follows: six foot minimum height,
six foot minimum depth, and four foot minimum width.
the following
The successful definition must include the
following:the placing of the term within a class; the
distinguishing of the term from other items in the
class; an example illustrating the term.
below
Below, you will find the necessary instructions for
complete assembly of the rocking horse.

An Explicit-Implicit Continuum
As noted in the overview of the linguistic perspective,
a language is a marvelously complex and prolific system of
symbols.

This symbol system is so rich and so variegated

that it complements the richness and variegation of the
human mind in a pari passu relationship, thus enabling
humans to achieve levels of thought higher than possible at
the level of sign.
The richness and variegation of this symbol system is
evident when one considers that in English 26 letters form
approximately 1,000,000 words, and of these 1,000,000 words,
one can form an infinite number of sentences.

It is this

unlimited combinatorial nature that one must wrestle with
and express oneself through as one attempts to make sense of
one's surroundings and life.

Fortunately, this burgeoning

infinity of language is made manageable through the logic of
natural language.

At the very nucleus of this logic are the
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semantically primal qualities of symbolic reference and
logical identity.

Symbolic reference enables the symbol to

re-present for the language user the referent, and, as
Waldron demonstrates, is not a mundane affair, but one
having significant cognitive implications which chapter
three will relate to the cognitive elements of global
coherence.
Symbolic reference is distinguished by polysemy, yet
this very characteristic, which elevates sign to symbol,
thereby affording to it greater utility, also affords to it
greater potential for ambiguity or confusion.

This

liability is offset, however, by the second nuclear quality
of natural language logic, logical identity, for logical
identity not only helps one winnow the several meanings a
term may have, but it also enables one to view the item with
a consistent meaning throughout a text, and it is here that
the significance of the linguistic elements of global
coherence becomes evident.
If one compares the very small number of anaphoric and
cataphoric elements to the million-plus words available in
the English language, and, as will be done in chapters three
and four, if one compares the essentially explicit nature of
these linguistic elements to the relatively implicit nature
of the cognitive and contextually salient elements of global
coherence, one may rightly be intrigued by their prominence
in the overall schema of global coherence; upon analysis,
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one finds that their small number is offset by their high
frequency of usage.

Further, one finds that their word

class, their relatively small number and high frequency, and
their mandatory explicitness enable logical identity.
If one holds that symbolic reference is rooted in, but
not restricted to, empirical experience, if one follows
Wolfgang Dressler and others who posit that semantic deep
structure consists solely of noun phrases, and further, that
the overwhelming use of symbolic reference is not empirical
reference, i.e., referring exclusively to the empirical
here-and-now, but instead, that most language use is modal
reference, i.e., referring to all situations and
circumstances not in the empirical here-and-now (Waldron),
one can see that the properties of word class, relatively
small number and high frequency, and mandatory explicitness
enable the linguistic elements of global coherence to serve
an essential role in the cohering of discourse.

The

dominant word class for the linguistic elements of global
coherence is that of pro-forms or their derivatives, even in
elliptical constructions (e.g., the possessive pronouns his
and hers).

These pro-forms are either full or truncated

noun phrases and represent surface manifestations quite
similar to the corresponding noun phrase in semantic deep
structure.

The small number and high frequency of the

linguistic elements of global coherence ease memory load,
increase clarity (when used consistently and with a definite
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antecedent), and further reinforce the noun phrase/semantic
deep structure property.
The mandatory explicitness of the linguistic elements
of global coherence links in a basic way the roots of
symbolic reference and empirical reference, the latter of
which is explicit by nature.

To be sure, pro-forms are used

for modal reference as well as for empirical reference, but
even when pro-forms are used for modal reference, the
condition of mandatory explicitness applies, just as the
early users of language had to explicitly re-present their
empirically-rooted experience.

That is, the early users of

language initially used language to refer to the
here-and-the-now, and from this "symbolic base," they then
developed modal reference.

One may even go so far as to

speculate that the explicit nature of the linguistic
elements of global coherence is, in the evolutionary sense,
a remnant of the explicit nature that all early symbolic
reference required.

Whether or not this speculation will be

proven, one can, through analyses of texts such as those by
Halliday and Hasan, Gutwinski, and Markels, attest to the
predominantly explicit nature of the linguistic elements of
global coherence, as the continuum below demonstrates.

74

An Explicit-Implicit Continuum
<-------EXPLICIT----------------------IMPLICIT------>
repetition
anaphora
cataphora
ellipsis

ellipsis

Because of the mandatory explicitness of the linguistic
elements of global coherence, all four categories-repetition, anaphora, cataphora, and ellipsis--are located
at the explicit end of the continuum, but because ellipsis
has an implicit component, it is also located at the
implicit end of the continuum.

This continuum will be

revised and expanded as chapters three and four explore the
explicit and implicit nature of the cohering elements
treated in the cognitive and contextually salient
perspectives of global coherence.
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CHAPTERll
THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE
The absence of works treating global coherence from a
cognitive perspective precludes a review of works such as
that in chapter two, where the linguistic perspective of
global coherence was investigated through the works of
Halliday and Hasan, Gutwinski, and Markels.

Instead, the

cognitive perspective will be approached through the
umbrella concept of the given/new relationship, through
Gestalt psychology, and through central cognitive processes,
with the intention of identifying elements of the cognitive
perspective of global coherence and locating these elements
on an explicit-implicit continuum.

Overview of the Cognitive Perspective
The word cognition derives from co + gnoscere (Latin)
and gignoskein (Greek), meaning to come to know (161).
Helpful in the understanding of cognition is the derivation
of the related term, cognate: co + gnatus· (Latin), to be
born; akin to gignere (Latin), to beget (161).

One

additional term will be helpful in understanding what is
meant by the cognitive perspective: cognizance, which means
range of apprehension, of becoming aware (161).

Thus, when

one speaks of cognition, one is speaking of purposeful
mental activity, and it is precisely this kind of purposeful
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mental activity a composition teacher seeks to nurture in
his or her students as they wrestle with and generate their
writing.
In a descriptive sense, cognition may be thought of as
unconscious, intuitive, or conscious.
Examples of unconscious cognition are the biochemical
threshold and the subconscious.

The biochemical threshold

deals with the firing of neurons and of the interaction of
receptors and synapses, among other neuro-anatomical
features.

The subconscious deals with aspects such as the

id, dreams, repressed thoughts, and pre-intuition.
Intuitive cognition is cognition neither conscious nor
unconscious but drawing from and dwelling in both states
until the intuition's realization or fruition.

It is the

"Eureka!" experience which continues to fascinate cognitive
scientists and composition teachers alike.
Intuitive cognition may fascinate composition teachers,
but it is conscious cognition that teachers of composition
are primarily concerned with.

Conscious cognition may be

subdivided into unattending and attending cognition.
unattending cognition is cognition in relation to learned
behavior which has become virtually automatic.

Examples of

this are cognition accompanying ordinary speech, the act of
checking for traffic before crossing a street, or the
habitual setting of an alarm clock.
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Attending cognition is cognition that is directed and
aware, consciously purposeful (cf. cognizance).

Attending

cognition may be subdivided in the following manner: 1) a
normally unattending cognition made attending due to unusual
circumstances: 2) metaprocesses; 3) cogitation.

Examples of

normally unattending cognition made attending due to unusual
circumstances are cognition accompanying the deliberate
articulation of an utterance, the crossing of a street with
a child for the first several times, or the setting of an
alarm at 4:00 a.m. to view Halley's comet.

Examples of

metaprocesses are thinking about thinking, talking about
talking, and so forth.

Cogitation, the third subdivision of

attending cognition, is the conscious, purposeful use of
functional cognitive systems qua functional cognitive
systems.

Examples are formal problem solving, the composing

of discourse (purposeful use of a symbol system), or a
16-year-old's arguing for the purchase of his own car.

It

is this kind of cognition that humans engage in when they
consciously and purposefully use functional cognitive
systems qua functional cognitive systems, whether these
systems are a symbol system in the form of written language
or the central cognitive processes discussed below.
Although the principal focus of the cognitive
perspective on global coherence will be central cognitive
processes as cohering elements within a cognitive system,
two global properties must first be considered, for they to
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varying degrees subtend all central cognitive processes as
well as the linguistic elements of global coherence.

Those

two properties are the given/new relationship and Gestalt.

The Given/New Relationship
Regardless of one's epistemological foundations or
leanings, whether one is an Objectivist, a Cartesian, a
Kantian, or whether one hews to the Occident, to the Orient,
or attempts a synthesis somewhere in between, the given/new
relationship is fundamental.

without the given/new

relationship, one has no point of orientation (de Beaugrande
184-85): one can only flounder endlessly with no hope of
making sense of one's thoughts, one's environment, or one's
place in it.

A human by nature reasons from given to new.

The given is one's "old" information, that which one has
already been introduced to or stored, and, along with the
"new," is fundamentally embedded in epistemological and
logical frameworks such as Toulmin's data/warrant/claim,
Piaget's assimilation/accomodation, Kuhn's normal
science/crisis/revolutionary science, and Hegel's
thesis/antithesis/synthesis.

Not only does the given orient

a person, but it also serves as one's point of departure for
cognitive operations, whether the operation is the
predication of a sentence, the completion of a hierarchy of
categories, or the formation of the categories themselves.
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In the prior chapter, four categories of elements in
the linguistic perspective of global coherence were
delineated: repetition, anaphora, ellipsis, and cataphora.
All four are subject to the given/new relationship.
Repetition, the duplication of the referent itself, is
re-iteration of the given.
[3:1]

(G)

(N)

(G)

(N)

(G)

(N)

He will go home; he will eat; he will sleep.
Cataphora is the reversal of the usual direction of
reference: it refers forward from pro-form to referent.
(N)

[3:2]

(N)

(G)

(G)

This is what you need to do.
home.

(N)

You need to go

Anaphora represents the normal direction of reference
in English, backward from the pro-form to the referent.
[3: 3 ]

(G)

(N)

(G)

John is a good swimmer.
daily.

(N)

He swims three miles

Ellipsis is rarely cataphoric and almost always
anaphoric; thus, it, too, is a referring backward from the
zero element to the referent, enabled through parallel
structure:
[3:4]

(G)

(N)

[G]

I want to go home,

(N)

[G]

(N)

[zero] eat, and [zero] sleep.

What is noteworthy is that the linguistic elements of global
coherence always represent the given in any particular
given/new relationship.

This specific property of the

linguistic elements helps to explain their mandatory
explicitness and their high frequency of occurence in a
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text.

Moreover, this relationship to the given illustrates

the bond between the relatively few linguistic elements in a
text and their maintenance of logical identity in the text.
The linguistic elements, by representing the given in a
text, ensure a consistent point of reference, thus
satisfying what is perhaps the first requisite of coherence.
Not only is the given/new relationship prevalent in the
linguistic perspective of global coherence as evinced in the
above examples, but it is also prevalent in the cognitive
perspective as the discussion of central cognitive processes
will show.

Gestalt
The second global property to be considered in the
cognitive perspective is Gestalt.

As observed in chapter

one, humans naturally assume things to "make sense"; "making
sense" is the "unmarked" condition or quality of language
processing.

Coherence is part-and-parcel of normal speech;

humans do not communicate not to be understood, but rather
to be understood and to understand.

This observation is as

true of written communication as it is of spoken
communication; however, the propensity towards coherence in
written communication, especially in extended discourse such
as an essay, is offset by its inherent complexities.

Yet

these inherent complexities can themselves be offset, at
least partly, if one is aware of natural and powerful
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tendencies in humans which have been studied by Gestalt
psychologists.
Gestalt psychologists believe that "organization is
basic to all mental activity, that it is unlearned, and that
it reflects the way the brain functions" (Gleitman 228).
Gestalt may be defined as an "organized whole," a notion
clearly akin to the views Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus,
as well as contemporary teachers of composition, share
regarding the nature of the successful piece of rhetoric.
In addition to its focus on the organized whole, Gestalt
psychology offers the following concepts which relate
closely to the composing process composition teachers
emphasize in the classroom: good continuation, closure, and
restructuring.
Good continuation is "a powerful organizational factor
which will often prevail even when pitted against prior
experience" (Gleitman 228-29).

An example from nature is

the tendency of an observer to view the twigs and branches
of a bush as continuations of one another, despite the
presence of a praying mantis lodged among the twigs and
branches.

The observer naturally seeks to view the twigs

and branches as continuous parts of the whole bush and quite
easily "blends" the slightly discontinuous body of the
praying mantis into the body of the bush.

Likewise, the

composition student, once having completed an outline or
rough draft of an essay, will also tend to see a continuity
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among the various parts of the whole outline or rough draft.
Such a tendency can impel the writer to write the outline or
the draft despite not yet having all the details at his or
her disposal, for the writer "sees" enough of the "twigs or
branches" of "the bush" to generate continuity, and
ultimately, global coherence, for the piece of writing.

Or,

in other words, good continuation often enables the writer
to, as Donald Murray puts it, "glimpse the potential text"
(60).

Of course, this tendency is two-edged: the student

may "see" the continuity when others may not, often due to
the outline or rough draft being too "writer-based" and not
sufficiently "reader-based" (Flower 19-37).
A second contribution from Gestalt psychology regarding
global coherence is the principle of closure, defined as the
tendency "to complete figures that have gaps in them"
(Gleitman 229).

If one sees only a portion of a circle

covered by a card, one will believe that the unseen portion,
covered by the card, completes the seen portion, thus making
a complete circle.

Likewise, when one sees an unfinished

sentence or a fill-in-the-blank sentence, one has a tendency
to finish the sentence or fill in the blanks.

Partly

filled-in crossword puzzles also draw on this cognitive
tendency toward closure, as does a cloze reading test.
Simililary, when one see a "gap" in a draft, one will feel a
tendency to close the gap, to make whole, the draft.
challenge for composition teachers, of course, is to

The
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instruct the student writers in such a way as for them to
"see" the gaps in their drafts so that they will then feel
this natural tendency toward closure.
The principle of restructuring is yet another
contribution from Gestalt psychology toward an understanding
of global coherence, especially when the composing process
is viewed as an exercise in problem-solving.

Gleitman

relates that restructuring "involves a dramatic shift in the
way [a] problem is viewed. . . .

[T]his shift may be very

sudden and is then experienced as a flash of insight, a
sense of 'aha'

." (330).

A similar sort of dramatic

shift or sense of "aha" occurs when, after wrestling with
how to structure a particular piece of discourse or how to
frame a particular topic, one finally grasps the structure
or the conceptual frame.

This particular Gestalt principle

is closely associated with the processes involved in
creative thinking and hence will be prevalent in those
composing situations involving reflective or emergent
thinking that exploratory writing requires (Hairston &
Ruszkiewicz 11-12).
Just as the efficient cause was vital to Aristotle's
understanding of the nature of knowledge (Selections 205),
so too is the property of Gestalt vital to the cognitive
perspective of global coherence.

As Aristotle's efficient

cause explains the driving force involved in change or
stability, Gestalt entails a natural and powerful "driving
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force" in humans to relate the part to the whole, and it is
this part-to-whole (or whole-to-part) relationship which
lies at the crux of this study of global coherence, which
was defined at the beginning as "the comprehensive,
systematic connection of constitutive elements of a text of
logical discourse, with a consistent emphasis on both the
totality [the whole] of the text and on the interrelatedness
of its constituents [its parts]" (chapter I, p. 2).

Central Cognitive Processes
central cognitive processes, along with the given/new
relationship and the tendency toward Gestalt, are basic to
human thought and form a sUbstantial portion of the
cognitive universals all humans share.

The linguistic

elements of global coherence, i.e., repetition, anaphora,
cataphora, and ellipsis, help maintain logical identity, and
the given/new relationship provides a point of logical
orientation, but central cognitive processes serve dual
purposes, for they are both "pathways" along which humans
experience outer and inner reality as well as the "nuts and
bolts" elements humans use as they respond to the Gestalt
impetus and attempt to construct satisfactory part-to-whole
and whole-to-part relationships.
since classical times, rhetoricians have known of
Aristotle's topoi, which he viewed as places of the mind and
ways of finding something to say (The Rhetoric 154).

Ross
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Winterowd uses the concept of a "grammar of coherence" in
order to understand better the composing process (828-35).
Mary Lawrence, drawing from Jerome Bruner, uses the concept
of "structural vocabulary" as a pivot in her approach to
composition (5).

Randolph Quirk, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey

Leech, and Jan Svartvik use the term "logical connecters" to
designate numerous logical relationships between clauses
(661-76).

Rhetorical handbooks use terms such as

transitions, modes, thought patterns, and patterns of
organization (Bain; Davidson; Hairston & Ruszkiewicz; Corder

& Ruszkiewicz).

These various terms have in common their

recognition of central cognitive processes.

Each

composition theorist above employs in his or her approach
central cognitive processes, whether singly when using a
process such as cause and effect, antecedent and
consequence, or genus and division, or in combination with
other central cognitive processes as in the expository or
argumentative modes.
Central cognitive processes are unique, for they not
only occur at the limen on the explicit-implicit continuum
of cohering elements, but they also enable humans to
generate knowledge as well as organize it.

Consequently,

central cognitive processes are vital for the invention and
arrangement aspects of the composing process and therefore
merit special attention.
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Jerry Fodor, in Modularity of Mind, theorizes about a
functional taxonomy of cognition.

In his theory, the

concept of central systems occupies a key role; the
characteristics of these central systems are described
below.

(A more detailed account of the taxonomy is found in

Appendix II.)
not hardwired/unstable: neuroanatomy
"relatively diffuse"
(118)
quasi assembled: a larger system composed
of simpler systems
informationally unencapsulated: central
systems access information from each other
and from modules
domain neutral: "cut across cognitive
domains"
(101)
computationally global: may draw on other
central systems or modules to perform
operations
sensitive to belief system: during
computation, central systems consider an
individual's set of beliefs
isotropic: confirmation-relevant facts can
be "drawn from anywhere in the field of
previously established empirical truths"
(105)
Quineian: "the degree of confirmation
assigned to any given hypothesis is sensitive
to properties of the entire belief system; as
it were, the shape of our whole science bears
on the epistemic status of each scientific
hypothesis"
(107)
optional engagement: the operation of a
central system is not necessarily mandatory;
it can be elective
variable speed: may be very slow or
instantaneous
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These central systems may be thought of as central
cognitive processes; that is, central cognitive processes
are specific central systems which possess distinguishing
characteristics of their own while simultaneously possessing
all the characteristics detailed above in Fodor's theory.
Further, these central cognitive processes, as stated
earlier, not only guide an individual along "pathways"
through and by which one experiences and cogitates outer and
inner reality, but they also serve as "nuts and bolts"
elements in the individual's attempts to form coherent views
of that which is real in the past and present, and of that
which may be possible in the future.
In the introduction of this study (pp. 7, 11-12), I
asserted the necessity of instructing student writers to go
beyond the literal level of language and thought so that
they will not only think at the analytic, interpretive,
evaluative, and creative levels, but also articulate at
these higher levels of thought in globally coherent essays.
I argued that writing teachers are remiss if they do not
encourage student writers to look at the underlying logical
relationships of the clauses they are connecting and the
discourse blocks they are constructing, for this knowledge
will give them an increased understanding of how parts of a
composition cohere in fundamental, cognitive ways.

The

characteristics of central systems detailed above--inherent
in the central cognitive processes listed below--are those
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"fundamental, cognitive ways," and it is the central
cognitive processes that enable an individual to think in
non-linear ways, yet also enable him or her to attempt to
express non-linear thought within the constraints of linear
language.
While one's expressions in language are constrained by
linearity, one's thinking and mental imagery are not
(chapter II, pp. 36-40).

A significant feature of central

cognitive processes, and to a lesser degree, of the
given/new relationship and of Gestalt, is their inherent
capacity for enabling non-linear thought.

Waldron relates

that the leap from sign to symbol is monumental because
symbolic reference is itself a multi-faceted cognitive
operation (50).

When one uses a linguistic symbol, one not

only assigns a label to an entity, thus employing a
referential function to the symbol, but one also assigns to
the symbol a logical identity by which one distinguishes it
from other items, thus employing a differential function; as
one differentiates between referents, one naturally forms
categories; thus, the use of a linguistic symbol is also the
beginning of the categorial function, and categorization
entails central cognitive processes such as contrast,
comparison, classification, and hierarchiazation.

Language

and higher thought, then, truly develop pari passu, for to
use the linguistic symbol is to engage fundamental and
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powerful cognitive systems, and yet without the linguistic
symbol, these same cognitive systems would be inexpressible.
Thus, the listing below of central cognitive processes
as elements in the cognitive perspective of global coherence
is also the listing of powerful processes that cut across
cognitive domains, processes that are not just
inter-connected, but which are isotropic.

They are also

processes that access long-term and short-term memory, that
are engaged at the option of the individual person, and that
may be used at a speed dependent on the discretion of the
indi vidual.

Cognitive Elements of Global Coherence
Below are sixteen central cognitive processes listed in
a developmental continuum, along with illustrative examples
and explicit markers.

The developmental continuum is

tentative, but it may be seen as a provisional step toward
understanding how one central cognitive process is logically
prior to another.

Jung argues that "differentiation is the

essence, the sine qua non of consciousness" (95).

Contrast,

then, may be thought of as a human's first cognitive act; it
could first occur in the womb when the fetus becomes aware
of the me/not me distinction regarding its body and the
confining wall of the womb.

such a distinction is used by

Edmund Leach in his elaborating the notion of binary coding,
a property which, he argues, is common to human
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communication (62-63).

Further, if categorizing is defined

as grouping by differences or similarities, then both
contrasting and comparing must be logically prior to
categorizing.

similarly, if hierarchiaizing is seen as an

ordering of categories according to levels of subordination
or superordination, then contrasting, comparing, and
categorizing are logically prior to it.

Likewise,

analogizing presumes contrasting and comparing, at the very
least, because it consists of drawing parallels or
similarities between or among dissimilar entities.

However,

such entities may also be hierarchies themselves, and thus
analogizing presumes hierarchiazation, as well as contrast,
comparison, and analogy.

synthesizing, defined as the

expressing of coherence among seemingly disparate entities
or relationships, is listed in the final position because
when one synthesizes, one is free to draw on any combination
of the other central cognitive processes in order to express
such a coherence.
The purpose of the list, then, is not to establish its
inclusiveness, but to embrace under a single rubric such
concepts as Aristotle's topoi, winterowd's grammar of
coherence, Lawrence's structural vocabulary, Quirk,
Greenbaum, Leech, and Svartik's logical connecters, and
terms often used in handbooks or within the discipline such
as transitions, modes, thought patterns, and patterns of
organization.
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[3:5]

CONTRASTING: the indicating of differences between
entities
implicit rendering:
Thomas Jefferson was a very orderly and
temperate man; Samuel Adams was
absent-minded and hot-tempered.
explicit rendering:
Thomas Jefferson was a very orderly and
temperate man, unlike Samuel Adams, who was
absent-minded and hot-tempered.
explicit markers: on the contrary, by
comparison, on the one hand . • . on the other
hand, by way of contrast, instead, but,
although, however, differ from, different from,
still, otherwise, even so, nevertheless, still,
dissimilarly, less than, more than, faster than
(etc.), in contrast, in opposition, on the
opposite side, while, admittedly, in reality, of
course, actually, true

[3:6]

SPATIALIZING: the ordering of items in space
implicit rendering:
none possible
explicit rendering:
Please place the green chair here, the red
one there, and the couch in between.
explicit markers: next to, alongside of, in,
into, out of, outside of, over, under,
underneath, below, above, across, among, around,
before, behind, beneath, beside, beyond, off,
opposite, round, through, within, north, south,
east, west, to the right, to the left, front,
middle, rear, side, adjacent midpoint, endpoint,
diagonal, edge, parallel, perpendicular,
co-planar, overlapping, vertical, horizontal

[3:7]

COMPARING: the indicating of similarities
between entities
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implicit rendering:
Jefferson believed passionately in freedom
of thought and freedom of religion.
Franklin, another "founding father,"
believed strongly in freedom of thought and
freedom of religion.
explicit rendering:
Jefferson believed passionately in freedom
of thought and freedom of religion.
So,
too, did Franklin.
explicit markers: as, just as, similarly,
similar to, in the same way, almost the same, at
the same rate as, like, alike, likewise, in like
manner, correspond to, correspondingly,
resemble, resemblance, to be parallel in . . . ,
to have . . . in common, common features,
characteristics, etc.
[3:8]

POSITING CAUSE AND EFFECT: the stating of an action
or a condition and its
result
implicit rendering:
Unfortunately, John went out drinking last
night. He drove recklessly. NOW, he is in
the hospital, paralyzed from the waist
down.
explicit rendering:
Unfortunately, John went out drinking last
night. Because he did so, he drove
recklessly. Now, as a tragic consequence,
he is in the hospital, paralyzed from the
waist down.
explicit markers: so, so that, so much (so)
that, thus, consequently, as a consequence, in
consequence, therefore, accordingly, for, for
fear (that), for the purpose that, for this
reason, as a result, hence, because, because of,
owing to, since, due to, being that, in that, in
the hope that, seeing that, so much that,
inasmuch as, forasmuch as, in view of, with this
in mind, with this intention, to the end that,
lest, if, even if, only if, unless, in case,
provided that, providing that, on (the)

96

condition that, in the event that given that,
granted (that), granting (that), as long as, so
long as, then, if so, in that case, that being
the case, under those circumstances, if not,
otherwise
[3:9]

CATEGORIZING: grouping by similarities or differences
implicit rendering:
Apples, oranges, and tangerines contain
seeds. Fish, beef, and mutton are meats.
explicit rendering:
Apples, oranges, and tangerines are alike
in that they all contain seeds.
Fish,
beef, and mutton are similar in that they
all are meats.
explicit markers: as, just as, similarly,
similar to, in the same way, almost the same, at
the same rate as, like, alike, likewise, in like
manner, correspond to, correspondingly,
resemble, resemblance, to be parallel in . . . ,
to have . . . in common, common features,
characteristics, etc., on the contrary, instead,
by comparison, on the one hand . . . on the
other hand, by way of contrast, but, although,
however, differ from, different from, still,
otherwise, even so, nevertheless, still,
dissimilarly, less than, more than, faster than
(etc.), in contrast, in opposition, on the
opposite side, while, admittedly, in reality, of
course, actually, true

[3:10]

SPECIFYING: the providing of a detail at a lower
level of generalization for an entity at
a greater level of generalization
implicit rendering:
Diogenes was a simple man. His only
material possessions were his toga and a
bowl.
explicit rendering:
Diogenes was a simple man. For example,
his only material possessions were his toga
and a bowl.
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explicit markers: for example, for instance, for
one thing, to illustrate, in one instance, in
other words, as follows, as proof, let me
illustrate, let me cite as proof, in
substantiation, to substantiate, as an
illustration, in this instance, as an example,
in practice, according to statistics, according
to statistical evidence, such as, especially,
particularly, in particular, notably, by way of
example, namely, to be specific, specifically,
that is (to say); take . . . , for example;
consider . . , for example
[3:11]

ANALYZING: the stating of component parts
implicit rendering:
none possible
explicit rendering:
Although now regarded by many as a quaint
form of transportation, a bicycle consists
of several highly-tooled parts, including
tires, rims, spokes, a chain, and cables.
explicit markers: consists of, is composed of,
divides into, includes, including, have, has,
components, parts, aspects, qualities,
attributes, characteristics, factors, eras,
times, regions, sector, factor, piece, particle,
section, member, segment, constituent, element,
ingredient, feature, contents

[3:12]

INDUCING: the drawing of a conclusion
from particulars
implicit rendering:
Holmes turned to Watson.
"The
chemical tests confirm that Eggert's hands
had carried sulphur.
Eggert was at the
scene of the crime. And he certainly had
sufficient motive."
"Eggert is our man!" exclaimed Watson.
But Holmes only furrowed his brow and
said, "Perhaps."
explicit rendering:
Holmes turned to Watson.
"The
chemical tests confirm that Eggert's hands
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had carried sulphur. Eggert was at the
scene of the crime. And he certainly had
sufficient motive."
"Therefore," exclaimed Watson, "Eggert
is our mant "
But Holmes only furrowed his brow and
said, "Perhaps."
explicit markers: so, thus, consequently,
therefore, accordingly, for these reasons, as a
result, hence, because, because of, owing to,
since, due to, it follows, being that, seeing
that, as, inasmuch as, in view of, owing to
[3:13]

CHRONOLOGIZING: the ordering of entities
according to time
implicit rendering:
He unlocked the door and entered the dark
room. He turned on the lights. The room
erupted in shouts and huzzahs of
celebration.
explicit rendering:
First, he unlocked the door and entered the
dark room. Next, he turned on the lights.
Then, the room erupted in shouts and
huzzahs of celebration.

explicit markers: then, now, nowadays, at the
present, when, before, after, while, during,
between . . . and . . . , in (month/year), in
the (period of the day, e.g., morning,
afternoon), on (day of week or date), since . .
. , later, earlier, formerly every (number)
(years, months, days, minutes, etc.), at the
turn of the century (decade, etc.), in the first
(second, etc.) part of the century (month, week,
day, etc.), in the l800s, etc., at birth, in
childhood, in infancy, in adolescence, as an
adult, in adulthood, in old age, at death,
simultaneously, simultaneous with, at the same
time as, contemporaneously, co-eval, former,
latter, previous, previously, prior to, first,
second, etc., in the first place, in the second
place, etc., to begin with, to end with, next,
subsequently, at last, in conclusion, finally
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[3:14]

GENERALIZING: the stating of a principle based upon
specific observations
implicit rendering:
Rafe is only seven years old; he did not
realize he was plagiarizing Lincoln.
Olivia is only three years old; she did not
know that it is wrong to take cookies
without asking. Children are innocent in
things such as these.
explicit rendering:
Rafe is only seven years old; he did not
realize he was plagiarizing Lincoln.
Olivia is only three years old; she did not
know that it is wrong to take cookies
without asking. All children are innocent
in things such as these.
explicit markers: generally, generally speaking,
on the whole, all, every, never, always

[3:15]

HIERARCHIAZATION: the classifying of categories
implicit rendering:
none possible
explicit rendering:
American government can be subdivided into
four levels: local, county, state, and
national.
Each of these consists of
branches comprised of subordinate
departments, bureaus, and ministries.
explicit markers: classified, subdivided,
levels, graded, sorted, ranked, arranged,
ordered, organized, stratified, bracketed,
codified, lower, higher, consists of, is
composed of, divides into, includes, including,
have, has, components, parts, aspects,
qualities, attributes, characteristics, factors,
eras, times, regions, sector, factor, piece,
particle, section, member, segment, constituent,
element, ingredient, feature, contents, each,
every, single, respective
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[3:16]

DEDUCING: the drawing of a conclusion by reasoning
from a generality
implicit rendering:
Gringoes have big feet, pale skin, and
light eyes. Hans has big feet, pale skin,
and light eyes. Hans is a gringo.
explicit rendering:
All gringoes have big feet, pale skin, and
light eyes. Hans has big feet, pale skin,
and light eyes. consequently, Hans is a
gringo.

explicit markers: generally, generally speaking,
on the whole, all, every, never, always so, so
that, so much (so) that, thus, consequently, as
a consequence, in consequence, therefore
accordingly, for, for fear (that), for the
purpose that, for this reason, as a result,
hence, because, because of, owing to, since, due
to, being that, in that, in the hope that,
seeing that, so much that, inasmuch as,
forasmuch as, in view of, with this in mind,
with this intention, to the end that, lest, if,
even if, only if, unless, in case, provided
that, providing that, on (the) conditions that,
in the event that given that, granted (that),
granting (that), as long as, so long as, then,
if so, in that case, that being the case, under
those circumstances, if not, otherwise
[3:17]

ABSTRACTING: the assigning of a quality or an
intangible to an entity, often
tangible
implicit rendering:
Daily, she sacrifices for the poor.
Hourly, she prays for the lost.
By the
minute, she toils to heal the sick. Mother
Theresa is love.
explicit rendering:
Daily, she sacrifices for the poor.
Hourly, she prays for the lost.
By the
minute, she toils to heal the sick.
In
essence, Mother Theresa is love.
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explicit markers: in essence, essentially, in a
word, quintessentially, obviously, clearly,
without a doubt, nothing but . . • , sheer,
pure, purely
[3:18]

HYPOTHESIZING: the stating of a possible explanation
or of a contingency relationship
implicit rendering
none possible:
explicit rendering:
If Jonas Salk were to develop a vaccine for
AIDS, he surely would be award-ed another
Nobel Prize.
explicit markers: if . . . then, if so, had,
should, in (that) case, provided that, providing
that, on the condition that, in the event that,
given that, granted (that), granting (that) as
long as, so long as, even if, only if, that
being the case, under those circumstances,
unless, if not, otherwise; were, would, and
other subjunctive renderings

[3:19]

ANALOGIZING: the expressing of similarity between or
among dissimilar entities or
relationships
implicit rendering:
The successful actor can perform on the
stage in a variety of roles.
The
successful person can function well in a
number of positions.
explicit rendering:
Just as the successful actor can perform on
the stage in a variety of roles, so too can
the successful person function well in a
number of positions.
explicit markers: analogously, as, just as,
similarly, similar to, in the same way, almost
the same, like, alike, likewise, in like manner,
correspond to, correspondingly, resemble,
resemblance, to be parallel in . . . , to have .
. . in common, common features, characteristics,
etc.
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[3:20]

SYNTHESIZING: this, the paramount central cognitive
process, transcends analogy and
engages all other central cognitive
processes to express coherence among
seemingly disparate entities
implicit rendering:
Hydrogen is a plentiful yet explosive gas.
Mercury is a shiny and toxic liquid quite
sensitive to temperatures.
Iron is a hard
and somewhat brittle solid which decomposes
when exposed to air and water. They are
fundamental substances called elements and
cannot be decomposed into other substances.
explicit rendering:
Hydrogen is a plentiful yet explosive gas.
Mercury is a shiny and toxic liquid quite
sensitive to temperature.
Iron is a hard
and somewhat brittle solid which decomposes
when exposed to air and water. However
different they may be superficially, all
three share a unique characteristic. They
are fundamental substances called elements
and cannot be decomposed into other
substances.
explicit markers: the central cognitive process
of synthesis is explicitly rendered using
explicit markers from any of the other central
cognitive processes

An Explicit-Implicit Continuum
Our treatment of the linguistic perspective of global
coherence (chapter II, p. 74) resulted in the continuum
below:
<-------EXPLIcIT-----------------------------IM~LICIT------>

repetition
anaphora
cataphora
ellipsis

ellipsis
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It was noted that because of the mandatory explicitness of
the linguistic elements of global coherence, all four
categories--repetition, anaphora, cataphora, and
ellipsis--are located at the explicit end of the continuum,
but because ellipsis has an implicit component, it is also
located at the implicit end of the continuum.
It was also noted that the linguistic elements of
global coherence have special properties which serve an
essential role in the cohering of discourse, and that among
these properties are their dominant word form, their small
number and high frequency in a text, and their mandatory
explicitness.
Just as the linguistic elements have special functions
which serve to enable global coherence, so, too, do the
cognitive elements of global coherence.

Paramount among

these functions is parallel distributed processing.

This

function accounts for the interconnection of the above
listed central cognitive processes across domains, thus
yielding a property the significance of which is difficult
to overestimate: utility.

If the linguistic elements of

global coherence perform a vital function·by maintaining the
identity of the given in any particular given/new
relationship, the cognitive elements of global coherence
enable the writer to consummate the given/new relationship
by allowing him or her to bring to the "given" the "new"
constituent, or to fashion any logical relationship, be it
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one of contrast, analysis, or analogy.

Further, the

versatility of central cognitive processes enables an
individual to do this at the level of clause, paragraph,
essay, or book, at the micro-state or at the macro-state,
depending on the degree of chunking.

Chapter four will deal

with the contextual salience perspective of global coherence
and demonstrate that not only do humans use central
cognitive processes at various levels, but they also use
them in various combinations, depending on their purpose and
on specific elements of contextual salience.
Unlike the linguistic elements of global coherence,
which always have a mandatory explicit component manifested
in the text through and by language expressly for
co-referential purposes, the cognitive elements of global
coherence are often manifested in a liminal manner and serve
as a threshold at which the explicit/implicit distinction
blurs, as the examples above illustrate.

Consequently, the

explicit-implicit continuum, with elements from both the
linguistic and cognitive continuums, approximates the
following:
<-------EXPLICIT---------limen-----------IMPLICIT------->
given/new relationship

Gestalt

repetition
anaphora

central
cognitive
processes

cataphora
ellipsis

ellipsis
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The central cognitive processes occupy the limen
portion of the continuum because of the variable nature of
their overt markers; at times, their overt markers are
necessary, but often they are optional, depending on the
rhetorical situation.
In sum, central cognitive processes are universal to
humans, operate freely across all cognitive domains, and
process information in a parallel, distributed fashion.
Hence, central cognitive processes have great utility for
thinking in general, and for the student of writing in
particular.

Their ability to generate as well as organize

thought invests them with a unique value in the composition
classroom.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONTEXTUAL SALIENCE PERSPECTIVE
OF GLOBAL COHERENCE
Most humans strive to make sense of life, to discover a
coherence in, if not of, life.

History and literature are

replete with humans engaged in this quest, from figures of
note such as Solomon, laden with riches and satiated with
pleasures, who continued to quest for coherence in life as
he wrote Ecclesiastes and much of Proverbs, to the "small"
characters in Tolstoy's War and Peace and Anna Karenina, and
those of Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov, Crime and
Punishment, and The Idiot, who from their inauspicious

beginnings and endings raise the enduring questions of love
and hate, justice and injustice, of faith in and doubt of
life itself.

Regardless of their station in life, these

characters wrestle with and through language in their quest
for coherence.

Language is indispensable in this quest.

Knoblach and Brannon tell us,
Modern rhetorical theory, beginning as early as
the seventeenth century, finds a closer connection
between language and thought, discourse and
knowledge, than ancient speculation had supposed.
Far from serving an optional, ceremonial function,
composition--the forming process at the heart of
writing--is essentially related to learning, to
the individual's personal search for coherence in
experience.
It is also, as a manifestation of
human symbolic capacities, a natural endowment in
essence, not a technical skill.
(4)

As
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In this quest for coherence, then, humans use "the
natural endowment" of language, whether in life in general
or in a composition class in particular.
E. D. Hirsch, Jr., maintains that "the peculiar nature
of coherence . . . is not an absolute, but a dependent
quality" (237).

He goes on to argue that

The laws of coherence are variable; they depend
upon the nature of the total meaning under
consideration. Two meanings ("dark" and "bright,"
for example) which cohere in one context may not
cohere in another.
"Dark with excessive bright"
makes excellent sense in Paradise Lost, but if a
reader found the passage in a textbook on plant
pathology, he would assume that he confronted a
misprint for "Dark with excessive blight."
Coherence depends on the context, and it is
helpful to recall our definition of context: it is
a sense of the whole meaning, constituted of
explicit partial meanings plus a horizon of
expectations and probabilities. (1190)
Traditionally, the surface language of a text has been
the focus for the analysis of coherence.

As the review of

college handbooks in the beginning of this study
demonstrates, answers to questions of coherence were sought
routinely in the surface language of a text (Hodges &
Whitten, McCrimmon, Hairston & Ruszkiewicz, stewart, Corder

& Ruszkiewicz).

In actuality, however, the surface language

of a text does not bear all the burden of achieving global
coherence, as the implicit nature of some of the central
cognitive processes illustrates.

Consequently, the scope of

this study includes the contextually salient perspective as
well as the linguistic and cognitive perspectives.

By

considering implicit elements as well as explicit ones, one
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more accurately represents how various elements of a text
contribute to the global coherence of a composition or
essay.
While the linguistic elements of global coherence may
be used the most frequently and the most explicitly in the
text of a composition or essay, and the central cognitive
processes of global coherence serve bridging or liminal
functions, at times explicit and at times implicit, elements
of the contextually salient perspective are manifested in
the text through implied but powerful, fundamental, and
culturally-related concepts such as epistemological frames,
central metaphors, sociological models, and warrants.
Because the contextually salient perspective of global
coherence is culturally related, it often seems to be
omnipresent and ubiquitous.

Paradoxically, it is often the

most implicit aspect of global coherence, seldom manifesting
itself explicitly or directly through language meant to be
understood at the literal level, as in the linguistic and
cognitive global categories.

Instead, elements of the

contextually salient perspective manifest themselves in
language meant to be understood at the interpretive level in
the form of word choice, grammatical structure (voice,
nominalizations, etc.), rhetorical pattern of sentences,
thesis placement, and prevalence of particular central
cognitive processes, often resulting in emphasis on a
particular arrangement or pattern of thought.
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The following overview of the contextually salient
perspective will examine the interrelationships of
epistemological frames, central metaphors, sociological
models, and warrants as they serve to effect the global
coherence of a text.

Overview of the Contextually Salient Perspective
Epistemology deals with how humans know what they know
and what they accept as sensible and logical, and hence,
what they view as coherent.

A human's epistemological

framework, then, subtends and permeates all his or her other
logical relationships and operations.
In the West, two main epistemological frameworks have
evolved, die Geisteswissenschaften and die Naturwissenschaften (Dilthey).

Die Geisteswissenschaften is an

inclusive framework which accords equal epistemological
status to intangible entities such as thoughts, ideas,
abstractions, dreams, and logical relationships, as well as
to tangible entities such as those represented by one or
more of the five senses of sight, sound, touch, taste, and
smell.

Die Naturwissenschaften is an exclusive framework

which accords greater epistemological status to tangible
data, ostensibly accepting as valid only that which has
empirical characteristics.

Another key distinction made

between these two dominant frameworks is that die
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Geisteswissenschaften is essentially retrodictive and die
Naturwissenschaften is essentially predictive.
Often, this dichotomy has come to be viewed as a
mutually exclusive one: a datum must fall under one or the
other frameworks in either/or fashion.
evident

throughout American culture.

This dichotomy is
Colleges and

universities are divided between Arts (die Geisteswissenschaften) and Sciences (die Naturwissenschaften) i even
among the sciences, some are called "soft science," e.g.,
anthropology, sociology, and psychology (die Geisteswissenschaften), and others are called "hard science," e.g.,
biology, physics, and chemistry (die Naturwissenschaften)i
salaries and prestige are distributed according to this
dichotomy, with those working in the Naturwissenschaften
often receiving higher pay and greater social status, e.g.,
the mathematician, the physicist, and the chemist, as
opposed to those working in the Geisteswissenschaften, e.g.,
the anthropologist, the social worker, and the historian.
Regrettably, this dichotomy forces students to overemphasize one framework at the expense of the other, or to
exclude one altogether except for rudimentary courses in
fulfilling general education requirements.

Such a dichotomy

has another unfortunate consequence: many students
erroneously believe they are either "science" students or
"arts & humanities" students, and thus they fail to benefit
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fully from the entire spectrum of knowledge and learning
that life and academe have to offer them.
The consequences of epistemological frames are
apparent.

For example, the seminarian operating from the

premises of Naturwissenschaften will likely encounter much
difficulty, just as the behavioral psychologist who admits
only empirical data will meet with frustration.

In effect,

the epistemological frame serves as a filter for what may be
considered logical.

Thus, an epistemological frame

influences a person's life in the most fundamental of ways.
It determines one's very view of reality and the manner by
which one deals with this reality.

An epistemological

frame, then, determines what is sensible and logical, and
thus, what is coherent for an individual.

Central Metaphors
In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson
write that metaphors have traditionally been viewed in
philosophy and linguistics as "a matter of peripheral
interest" (ix).

In their book, however, Lakoff and Johnson

provide copious linguistic evidence which refutes this view.
Indeed, they argue convincingly that "metaphor is pervasive
in everyday language and thought" (ix).

This study in

global coherence follows this same argument.

Consequently,

metaphor comprises the second element examined in the
contextually salient perspective.
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The word metaphor derives from the Greek metapherein,
meaning to transfer or bear across (825).

In relating

metaphor to coherence, meanings of the word bear may be
helpful: to support and move, to hold in the mind, to
sustain, to disseminate, to lead, to give birth to, to
permit growth of, to extend in a

dir~ction

indicated or

implied (115).
Metaphor is defined as a type of one of the central
cognitive processes, analogy.

Metaphor consists of two

pairs of elements; one half of each pair, called the
attributant, expresses qualities or characteristics.

The

remaining half of each pair has a naming function and is
called the nominal.

These terms are used because they are

discipline neutral and functional in nature, as opposed to
those common to literary criticism such as tenor, vehicle,
and image, which presuppose a theory of tension in treating
metaphor (Richards).

Instead, the relationship used here

emphasizes a mapping between cognitive domains.
Consider the following three metaphorical expressions:
A) That boxer is a tiger; B) Hought is pronounced so that it
rhymes with bought; C) The world is a stage.
Metaphor A may be thought of as consisting of the
following two pairs of elements:
elemental pair 1:
animal with great strength & quickness (attributant)
tiger (nominal)
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elemental pair 2:
man with great strength & quickness (attributant)
man (nominal)
Metaphor A => That boxer is a tiger.
Metaphor B (Glass, Holyoak & Santa) may be thought of
as consisting of the following two pairs of elements:
elemental pair 1:
consonant cluster/known pronunciation (attributant)
bought (nominal)
elemental pair 2:
consonant cluster/unknown pronunciation (attributant)
hought (nominal)
Metaphor B => Hought rhymes with bought.
Metaphor C may be thought of as consisting of the
following two pairs of elements:
elemental pair 1:
where actors roleplay (attributant)
stage (nominal)
elemental pair 2:
where humans function in various roles (attributant)
unknown life model (nominal)
Metaphor C => The world is a stage.
All metaphors derive from two elemental pairs.

Of the

four elements (two attributants and two nominals), at least
three must be known.

Of the three known elements, cognitive

focus is on the two parallel elements, either
attributant:attributant or nominal:nominal.

Further, any

number of the central cognitive processes subsumed by
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analogy (chapter III, p. 93) can be utilized in order to
achieve the metaphor.

Hence, the emphasis is on a mapping

between cognitive domains rather than a theory of tension.
A metaphor may serve as a device for the bridging of
linguistic, cognitive, and experiential gaps.

Linguistic

bridging occurs when one has the thoughts and the
commonality of experience, but not the language, due to a
deficit in the speaker's idiolect or in the language itself:
for example, a speaker of English's resorting to the German
word blitzkrieg to describe a battle tactic in the European
Theater of World War II.

Cognitive bridging occurs when one

cannot apprehend meaning despite adequate language and
commonality of experience: for example, the use of the hand
to explain the concept of base ten in mathematics.
Experiential bridging occurs when one cannot apprehend
meaning despite adequate language and cognition: for
example, an extra-terrestial's borrowing from Earth culture
in order to explain to an Earthling a circumstance peculiar
to the extra-terrestial's world.

A metaphor may also serve

as an expressive device, the kind of which is often used in
poetry, colorful language, or literature:
That boxer is a tiger!

or
Or
or
or
or

ever the silver cord is loosed,
the golden bowl is broken,
the pitcher is broken at the fountain,
the wheel broken at the cistern;

Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was,
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and the spirit shall return unto God, who gave it.
(Ecclesiastes 12:6-7)
A metaphor may also serve as a condensed expression:
for example, in answer to the question "What kind of
politician was Margaret Thatcher?" one replies "She was a
female version of Ronald Reagan, but more cerebral and
candid."
Thus, metaphor is a much-used central cognitive
process; one often uses a metaphor as one attempts to
explain to others or to one's inner self how one aspect of
reality relates to another.

Weighty expressions such as

"life is a journey" or "the world is a stage" and less
weighty expressions such as "that boxer is a tiger" or
"she's a trip" help one communicate or understand what one
thinks or feels.

Lakoff and Johnson relate that metaphor is

"as much a part of our functioning as our sense of touch"
(239) .

Accordingly, a tendency towards a wide use of

metaphor seems second nature, and rarely does one shy from
it; rather, more often than not, when a particular metaphor
fails, one searches with alacrity for other metaphors that
might better convey one's understanding.

.One might think "X

is like Y--no, like Z!

Yes, that's it! X

is A!"

No, X is like A!

But, of the many metaphors humans employ daily and

hourly to help them better communicate or understand, they,
in a desire to simplify life and their comprehension of it,
often employ a metaphor which subsumes all other metaphors,
and indeed, permeates their thoughts and emotions and either
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reinforces their instincts or conflicts with them.

Such a

metaphor may be called a central metaphor.
A central metaphor serves humans in two crucial ways,
as guide and as touchstone.

A central metaphor serves as

guide when it indicates to an individual one's role, and
consequently, one's behavior, in life.

Just as importantly,

a central metaphor also serves as guide when it indicates
the role and behavior one comes to expect from fellow humans
and from one's environment.

A central metaphor serves as

touchstone when one returns to it to reassure oneself of
one's own weltanschauung and to re-affirm concord with one's
epistemological frame.

In a sense, it serves as a place in

one's consciousness where one can always go in order to sort
out the variables and changes of life.

Central metaphors,

then, are of the utmost importance in life.
Because they serve as shorthand versions of
epistemological frames, their number is few, and humans
normally use a small, consistent number of them, for they
must be reasonably consistent not only with one's
epistemological frame, but also with one's belief systems.
Indeed, some humans choose to die before they can or will
exchange particular central metaphors.

Witness the

individual who has embraced the central metaphor of chance
and uses it as an excuse to continue an addiction to alcohol
or to gambling, or witness the individual who has taken for
one's own the central metaphor of games and competes
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according to an agreed-upon set of rules for designated
prizes (Brown).

Thus, central metaphors are quite powerful

and exert great influence on individuals.
It was noted in chapter three (p. 89) that central
cognitive processes are isotropic and sensitive to belief
systems.

Central metaphors are particularly isotropic and

sensitive to belief systems.

Whenever one seeks to apply or

validate a specific central metaphor, one is utilizing the
central cognitive process of analogy, and due to its
position in the hierarchy of all central cognitive
processes, one may employ any of the subsumed central
cognitive processes (only the central cognitive process of
synthesis is not subsumed by analogy).

Further, because of

the isotropic quality of central cognitive processes, one
can draw from "anywhere in the field of previously
established empirical truths" to confirm that a
configuration of data is indeed what it seems to be (Fodor
105).

For example, in order for one to use the central

cognitive process of classification to determine that the
object that a set of adjectives is describing is an animate
male human, one may draw from any of one's empirical
experiences to confirm that the object is actually an
animate male human.
But central cognitive processes, and by extension,
central metaphors, are not limited to empirical data, for,
as Fodor argues, they are also sensitive to one's belief
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system.

For example, if an individual were not acquainted

with or did not accept transvestism and saw a male dressed
in hose, high heels, dress, make-up, and a wig, that
individual might not classify the male as a male regardless
of the adjectives indicating that the person was indeed an
animate male human.

Not only are individual central

cognitive processes sensitive to one's belief system in the
intra-cultural sense, but also in the cross-cultural sense.
While the dominant thought pattern in English is linear,
that in semitic languages is often parallel, and in many of
the oriental languages, the dominant thought pattern is that
of a spiral (Kaplan 410).

Thus, the belief systems of the

individual and of the individual's culture influence
significantly what and how data are classified,
hypothesized, abstracted, and analogized, for example, as
well as whether the dominant arrangement in a text is of one
particular order or another.

If the data are not processed

or arranged in accordance with the belief system, the result
is judged incongruous with one's central metaphor, and quite
possibly, incoherent.
Accordingly, Lakoff argues that metaphors go beyond the
traditional view of figures of speech (tropes): metaphors
are "figures of thought" (215).

This view more accurately

reflects the variety of elements and immense scope of
central metaphors; however, it also reveals the complexity
of central metaphors for the following reasons:
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1) All thought ultimately derives from time and
space relations, and it is arguable that time is a
function of space, or at the very least, is
dependent upon space for its conceptualization
(Jones 77-83).
2) Central metaphors are ubiquitous: they exist in
unconscious as well as conscious cognition, and
they may be instrumental in certain instances of
intuition.
Further, central metaphors, because
they are metaphors, are a type of analogy, the
central cognitive process which subsumes all other
central cognitive processes except that of
synthesis, and as a central cognitive process, is,
among other characteristics, domain neutral and
isotropic.
3) Metaphors, due to their position in the
hierarchy of central cognitive processes, are
isotropic to a very great degree, and the greater
the isotropism, the less one can comprehend the
process (Fodor 106), and this property is
intensified in a central metaphor because of its
scope.
Metaphor, then, is limited only by space and its
relationship in the hierarchy of central cognitive
processes: consequently, central metaphors overarch one's
thought processes and exert tremendous power and influence
in one's perception of how various elements of perceived
reality interrelate; indeed, central metaphors determine
these very relationships.
The following are categories of some.of the more
dominant occidental central metaphors: the metaphor of
growth, which has its formal roots in classical Greek
thought and is seen in various guises, for example, as
process or progress; the metaphor of drama, in which life is
viewed as a stage and members of society perform various
roles; the metaphor of chance, in which life is likened to a
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game of chance or fortune; the metaphor of games, in which
members of society compete according to an agreed-upon set
of rules for designated prizes (Brown). Accordingly, central
metaphors subtend virtually all the aspects of one's
consciousness and thus, one's notion of what fits with what,
what makes sense, what does not, and, significantly, what
serves to effect coherence and what does not.
Because of their powerful and deep influence, central
metaphors lead to the formulation of sociological models,
through and by which humans conduct their lives.

All the

sociological models sketched below "assume that human beings
negotiate their way through life in quest for meaning" (st.
Clair, "Language" 225), and that language is the medium of
symbolic representation which humans use for the
construction or understanding of social reality and the
maintenance of cultural values.

Further, language is the

medium of symbolic representation for an individual, group,
or society as problems, topics, or questions of self and
society are explored in a quest for coherence.
Within each of the four models of sociology outlined
below, language is used in various ways as an individual
engages in interpretive, analytical, critical, and creative
thought, going beyond the level of signs, of surface
impressions, and surface thinking.

In so doing, the

individual consciously and purposively uses language as a
symbol system in an attempt to form or fit his developing
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knowledge into a coherent whole.

This treatment of central

metaphors and sociological models does not imply that an
individual will employ a fixed number of central metaphors
and a particular sociological model and only those metaphors
and model, although this may be the case in some instances.
Rather, this treatment seeks to reveal how individuals may
use various central metaphors and sociological models,
including but not limited to those mentioned below.

Some

individuals may vary operative central metaphors and
sociological models as circumstances dictate.
Each of the two larger divisions of sociological
models--symbolic interactionism and phenomenology--embodies
the notion of social construction.

Symbolic interactionism

embodies the concept of a socially constructed world;
phenomenology embodies the construction of social
consciousness.

Whether the sociological model is one of

symbolic interactionism or of phenomenology, it may be
subtended by a single central metaphor or a small number of
central metaphors which act as a core of ad hoc
epistemological frames which help an individual negotiate
his or her way through life in some sort of coherent manner.
For example, if one embraces the central metaphor that "all
the world is a stage" and one has roles in which humans
should perform, one very well may operate within the
dramaturgical model; on the other hand, if one embraces the
central metaphor that life is a jungle and "survival of the
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fittest" is the rule, then one may operate within the
ethnomethodological model.

Likewise, if one accepts the

central metaphor of "the Establishment," one may operate
within the labeling model, or, if one subscribes, perhaps by
default, to the central metaphor of fate, then one may
operate within the existential model.

(For a similar set of

relationships, but based on linguistic models, see Lakoff
and Johnson concerning "experiential gestalts," [77-86].)
The following schemata seek to highlight contrasts and
similarities between the dramaturgical and labelling theory
models of sociology, which are subtypes of symbolic
interactionism, and the existential and ethnomethodological
models of sociology, which are subtypes of phenomenology
(st. Clair, "Language").
Dramaturgical Model
a. Social roles are created.
b. Individual perform in roles and use scripts.
c. Members are both audience and critic.
d. stage fright can be enhanced.
Labelling Model
a. People share a common world of symbolism.
b. Members are taught views of the world.
c. Such teaching establishes norms.
d. Norms enable an insider/outsider distinction.
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Existential Model
a. The world is without meaning.
b. Belief systems are arbitrary.
c. The world is full of alienation and insecurity.
d. Conflict and negotiation are the norm.
Ethnomethodological
a. Behavior is justified; excuses are explained.
b. Face games protect the member's identity.
c. Relationship games for impression management.
d. Members struggle for establishment of power.
e. An inherent "right to control others" exists.
f. Members have a need to re-affirm self-esteem.
Not only do central metaphors determine in large part
one's sociological models and how and what one views as
coherent, but they also determine significant parts of one's
vocabulary.

st. Clair argues that "language is never

neutral" (Social Metaphor, 41), and this lack of neutrality
is proven when one examines one's lexicon, for it can
quickly indicate the operational central metaphor and
sociological model.

For example, one who is using the

central metaphor of chance will likely include in his or her
lexicon many of the following expressions:
maybe I'll get lucky, good
odds are against it, let's
chips fall where they may,
the Man upstairs likes me,
you takes your chances, he
up, it's not my day

luck, chances are, the
take a chance, let the
Lady Luck smiled on me,
you pays your money and
lucked out, he lucked

Or, someone who is using the central metaphor of machine
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might have a lexicon which includes the following
expressions:
he's wired too tight, learn the nuts and bolts of
it, get cranked up, get in gear, stay in gear,
can't get out of low gear, missed a gear, in high
gear, hit the brakes, a little rusty, in sync,
ginning right along

Warrants
While one does not wear a lapel button announcing to
the world which central metaphor one is employing or which
epistemological framework one is operating within, both are
indicated implicitly in a multitude of ways, such as through
body language, lexicon, and prosodic features of spoken
language.

From the beginning, this study has emphasized the

explicit-implicit dynamic that involves the various elements
of

global coherence.

This part of the study examines an

element of global coherence that is a form of tacit
knowledge and which is integral to the very notion of
rhetoric.

In classical rhetoric, this form of tacit

knowledge was exemplified in the enthymeme, a truncated form
of syllogism with one of the premises implied, and is, as
Corbett puts it, "the instrument of deductive reasoning
peculiar to the art of rhetoric" (74).

But the minor or

major premise of a syllogistic argument is not all that is
implicit in the successful essay or composition.
When one composes an essay, one does not normally state
one's epistemological framework, nor the central metaphors
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one lives by, although it is perfectly possible to do so.
Likewise, one does not normally explain the sociological
model one is operating within.

Of course, one could inform

one's audience that one is a strict empiricist who believes
that life is best lived under the law of fang and claw
(though this connection is not a necessary one), and that
one role-plays and engages in the manipulation of symbols,
both linguistic and otherwise, in an effort to "come out on
top" in this "civil" contest of life in which only the
fittest survive.

And of course, one might inform one's

audience of one's epistemological framework, choice of
central metaphors, and sociological model in a genuine
effort to establish rapport, but normally, all of this and
much more is implied when one produces an essay or
composition, and this tacit knowledge, essential for
successful communication between the writer and the reader,
may be captured in a single concept: warrants.
In his The Uses of Argument, Stephen E. Toulmin argues
against traditional symbolic logic as the truest form of
argument.

He raises the following questions, questions

which bear directly on the notion of contextual salience:
What things about the modes in which we
assess arguments, the standards by reference to
which we assess them and the manner in which we
qualify our conclusions about them, are the same
regardless of field (field-invariant), and which
of them vary as we move from arguments in one
field to arguments in another (field-dependent)?
How far, for instance, can one compare the
standards of argument relevant in a court of law
with those relevant to a mathematical proof or a
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prediction about the composition of a tennis team?
(11)
What Toulmin is addressing here when he distinguishes
between "field-invariant" and "field-dependent" is the
notion of context, specifically, the notion of implied
context or background knowledge which the writer can safely
assume forms an implicit "bridge" between him or her and the
audience.

The "standards of argument" may well differ from

a court of law to a mathematical proof to predictions of who
will and who will not make the tennis team.
will vary because the context varies.

The standards

Indeed, even within

argument types, e.g., within the field of law, the standards
will vary, as tax lawyers learn very quickly when they seek
to become trial lawyers.

Thus, the notion of context is

pivotal in the coherent argument, as it is in the coherent
essay or composition.
Significantly, much of what is contextually salient in
a rhetorical situation is implicit.

In his model of

argumentation, Toulmin calls the implicit part of the
background information which forms an implicit bridge
between the rhetor and the audience the warrant.

It might

also be thought of as the implicit and necessary part of a
writer's register.
The concept of warrants in rhetoric entails many
factors.

When one considers writing in various disciplines,

one notes that what is assumed for each discipline includes
epistemological frame, arrangement, and lexicon.

The writer
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of the scientific paper may be wed to empiricism for his or
her epistemological frame.

Also, he or she may follow a

specified arrangement such as observations, hypothesis,
hypothesis testing, results, and conclusions, as well as be
expected to employ a lexicon specific to the field.
Moreover, an "objective" tone will be assumed, and the use
of passive voice will be acceptable and perhaps encouraged.
In like manner, the writer of the literary essay will most
likely operate unconstrained by empiricism, have much more
freedom of arrangement, but also be expected to use a
lexicon specific to literary criticism.

The "subjective"

tone may be quite acceptable, even encouraged for the
interpretive portion of the paper, and passive voice will,
in all likelihood, be discouraged.
Warrants, then, may vary from discipline to discipline,
and when one writes in specific disciplines, one must
acquaint oneself with the discipline's particular warrants
and respect their bounds.

If one uses too much warrant,

i.e., if one assumes too much, one risks incoherence; if one
uses too little warrant, i.e., if one assumes too little,
one risks tedious repetition, much as one would if one were
to avoid the use of pronouns and elect instead to name the
proper noun at its every reference.

In this latter case,

warrants, in a sense, serve a shorthand function paralleling
that of the pronoun in the linguistic perspective of global
coherence.
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Moreover, and equally important, the appropriate
warrant enables one physician to pick up a journal and read
with confidence and efficiency an article written by another
physician, or a biologist to read with confidence and
efficiency an article written by another biologist, or a
social worker to read with confidence and efficiency an
article written by another social worker.

Warrants are

determined by a "match" at various levels of rhetoric: from
a narrow match for writing done within particular
disciplines by members of the discipline for members of the
discipline, to a broad match when one writes for members of
what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call the "universal
audience" (30-35).

Once the warrant has been established,

then such rhetorical features as arrangement, lexicon, and
tone follow by mutual assent between writer and audience.

Contextually Salient Elements of Global Coherence
The contextually salient perspective of global
coherence is culturally related; thus, it often seems to be
omnipresent and ubiquitous.

However, it is often the most

implicit aspect of global coherence.

The contextually

salient perspective seldom manifests itself explicitly or
directly through language meant to be understood at the
literal level, as in the linguistic and cognitive
perspectives, but rather in language meant to be understood
at the interpretive level in the form of such key components
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of a composition as lexicon, grammatical structure (e.g.,
voice and nominalizations, etc.), rhetorical pattern of
sentences (e.g., balanced, loose, or periodic), thesis
placement, and prevalence of particular central cognitive
processes (often resulting in emphasis on a particular
arrangement or pattern of thought).
What follows is a summary listing of contextually
salient elements of global coherence.

Just as the listing

of the cognitive elements of global coherence was not meant
to be exhaustive, neither is this list meant to be
exhaustive.

Rather, it is offered in an attempt to draw

appropriate attention to largely implicit elements of a text
which traditionally have been overlooked or pointedly
excluded.

We might recall that Halliday and Hasan seem to

give equal status to both register and cohesion, the latter
being the focus of their study.

Indeed, according to

Halliday and Hasan, "texture" (global coherence) is achieved
through the mutually complementary relationship of
"register" and "cohesion" (23).

As noted above, the concept

of warrants and all it entails may be regarded as the
implicit and necessary part of a writer's register.
Halliday and Hasan define register as "the set of
meanings, the configuration of semantic patterns, that are
typically drawn upon under the specified conditions, along
with the words and structures that are used in the
realization of the meanings" (23).

Halliday and Hasan thus
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acknowledge the essential nature of extra-textual elements
in order for a text to evince global coherence, but they
limit their work to the surface language of a text,
deliberately and explicitly excluding register, and thus
warrants, from their study of cohesion in English.
Gutwinski goes even further with regard to
extra-textual elements of global cohesion.

As noted in

chapter two (p. 47), he believes coherence to be
unanalyzable in the linguistic sense because it deals with
phenomena which "cannot be treated on a single level of
analysis and some which are not open to linguistic analysis
at all" (26).

Such a position, which allows only for

empirical data, bespeaks of the epistemological framework

Naturwissenschaften, and is an exclusionary one which does
not begin to address the complex and multi-layered elements
which function to cohere an essay or composition.
The following list, then, is an attempt to account for
at least some of the major elements of global coherence in
the contextually salient perspective; these elements, though
implicit, are nonetheless essential.

Indeed, they may be

the most pervasive and powerful of all the elements of
global coherence, for they deal not only with
epistemological frameworks, but also with one's values and
belief systems.
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Examples of Epistemological Frames
Geisteswissenschaften: the inclusive frame which
utilizes both intangible and
tangible data
Naturwissenschaften: the exclusive frame which utilizes
only tangible data
Examples of Central Metaphors
Cosmos: the metaphor which emphasizes the harmony,
order, and balance exhibited in the universe
Growth: the metaphor which views the good in terms such
as expansion or increasing consumption
Jungle: the metaphor which views life as the survival
of the fittest
Chance: the metaphor which emphasizes the randomness
and unpredictability of life
Fate: the metaphor which views life's events as
foreordained
Journey: the metaphor which likens life to a trip
having a definite beginning, interim
passage(s), and destination
The Establishment: the metaphor which acknowledges a
controling status quo
Money: the metaphor that life has a cash nexus and
everything is viewed in relation to this nexus
Machine: the metaphor that life is mechanistic, and
accordingly is analyzable and predictable
stage: the metaphor that life is drama and requires
various roles to be played
Examples of Sociological Models
dramaturgical
labelling
phenomenological
ethnomethodological
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Examples of Enabling Features Which Effect Warrants
lexicon
grammatical structure
arrangement
thesis placement
prevalence of particular central cognitive processes
rhetorical pattern of sentences
tone

An Explicit-Implicit Continuum
Our treatment of the linguistic perspective of global
coherence resulted in the continuum below:

<------EXPLICIT------------------------------IMPLICIT------>
repetition
anaphora
cataphora
ellipsis

ellipsis

It was noted that because of the mandatory explicitness
of the linguistic elements of global coherence, all four
categories--repetition, anaphora, cataphora, and ellipsis-are located at the explicit end of the continuum, but
because ellipsis has an implicit component, it is also
located at the implicit end of the continuum.
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It was also noted that unlike the linguistic elements
of global coherence, which always have a mandatory, explicit
component manifested in the text through and by language
expressly for co-referential purposes, the cognitive
elements of global coherence are often manifested in a
liminal manner and serve as a threshold at which the
explicit-implicit distinction blurs.

consequently, the

explicit-implicit continuum with elements from both the
linguistic and cognitive continuums approximated the
following:

<------EXPLICIT--------------limen-----------IMPLICIT------>
given/new relationship

Gestalt

repetition
anaphora

central
cognitive
processes

cataphora
ellipsis

ellipsis

The central cognitive processes were located at the
limen position of the continuum because of the variable
nature of their overt markers; at times, their overt markers
are necessary, but often they are optional, depending on the
rhetorical situation.

NOw, it is necessary to locate the

elements of the contextually salient perspective of global
coherence on the explicit-implicit continuum.
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The overwhelming use of language is not empirical
reference, i.e., reference exclusively to the empirical
here-and-nowi rather, most language use is modal reference,
i.e., reference to all situations and circumstances not in
the empirical here-and-now.

Just as the referents of this

modal use of language are not located in the here-and-now,
the contextually salient elements of global coherence are
not located within the text.

Accordingly, one can posit an

explicit-implicit continuum as follows:
<------EXPLICIT----------limen-------------IMPLICIT------>
given/new relationship

Gestalt
epistemological frames
central metaphors
sociological models
warrants
central
cognitive
processes

repetition
anaphora
cataphora
ellipsis

ellipsis

This schema is far from complete, but it offers a set
of elements from three different perspectives that may serve
as a manageable framework within which one can better
analyze and teach global coherence.

The schema suggests a

complex and multi-layered continuum of elements which
function to globally cohere an essay or composition.

While
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this continuum reflects an explicit-implicit dynamic, it
does not represent a configuration which integrates the
three global perspectives and their respective elements.
In the next, and concluding, chapter of this study, such a
configuration is offered, as well as implications for
teaching student writers to produce globally coherent
compositions.
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CHAPTER V
SYZYGY
This study in global coherence for the teacher of
composition began with the following two passages from
classical rhetoric's On the Sublime.

Longinus wrote ".

we see skill in invention, and due order and arrangement of
matter, emerging as the hard-won result not of one thing nor
of two, but of the whole texture of the composition" (43).
He continued:
Now, there inhere in all things by nature
certain constituents which are part and parcel of
their substance.
It must needs be, therefore,
that we shall find one source of the sublime in
the systematic selection of the most important
elements, and the power of forming, by their
mutual combination, what may be called one body.
(69)

I have sought to identify these "most important
elements" so that teachers of composition, and particularly
their students, will have a better idea of what a coherent
essay or composition entails.

Perhaps more importantly,

teachers and students in composition

clas~es

may also have a

better idea of why a particular paper fails to cohere and
what might be done to remedy the lack of coherence.
Toward this end, three lines of inquiry were followed:
a linguistic perspective, a cognitive perspective, and a
contextually salient perspective.

The linguistic

perspective was investigated first, for, as a review of
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college handbooks revealed, what attention had been given
the notion of coherence was given principally at the
sentence level and restricted to the surface language of the
sentence.
Three major works dealing with coherence from a
linguistic perspective were analyzed: Halliday and Hasan's

Cohesion in English, Gutwinski's Cohesion in Literary Texts,
and Markels' A New Perspective in Cohesion in Expository

Paragraphs.

Excepting a portion of Markels' work, the

analysis revealed a tendency to exclude extra-textual
aspects of discourse.
The analysis of these works also resulted in the
identification of linguistic elements of global coherence
and their location along an explicit-implicit continuum.
These linguistic elements serve a co-reference function,
constitute sets with a relatively small number of words in a
given text, occur frequently, and have a mandatory
explicitness so that they can enable logical identity and
consistency of reference.

These elements are shown on the

explicit-implicit continuum below.
<------EXPLICIT------------------------------IMPLICIT------>
repetition
anaphora
cataphora
ellipsis

ellipsis
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The second line of inquiry, that of the cognitive
perspective, investigated the roles of the umbrella concepts
of the given/new relationship, Gestalt, and central
cognitive processes.

The central cognitive processes were

seen as serving a vital and dual role in effecting global
coherence, for they serve not only as "pathways" along which
humans experience outer and inner reality, but also as the
"nuts and bolts" of thought. They thus function to generate
thoughts as well as to organize them.

These central

cognitive processes were demonstrated to be optional in many
instances, and thus they are located at the limen along the
explicit-implicit continuum, as shown below.
<------EXPLICIT--------------limen-----------IMPLICIT------>
given/new relationship

Gestalt

repetition
anaphora

central
cognitive
processes

cataphora
ellipsis

ellipsis

The third line of inquiry, that of contextual salience,
explored the roles of epistemological frames, central
metaphors, sociological models, and warrants as they serve
to effect the global coherence of an essay or composition.
It was found that much of the function of these elements is
extra-textual and implicit, and that much of the language

143

used to signify them is used at the interpretive level.
These elements are pervasive and ubiquitous.

Below, the

contextually salient elements are located along the
explicit-implicit continuum in relation to the elements of
the linguistic and cognitive perspectives.
<-------EXPLICIT---------limen-----------IMPLICIT------->
Gestalt

given/new relationship

epistemological frames
central metaphors
sociological models
warrants
central
cognitive
processes
repetition
anaphora
cataphora
ellipsis

ellipsis

The elements listed above are not intended to be
inclusive; rather, they are meant to break new ground in the
study of coherence and to redistribute the burden of
coherence from the sentence level and from the surface
language of the text to a more inclusive and realistic
tri-partite focus.

In this sense, then, they may be thought

of as the "certain constituents" to which Longinus was
referring when he wrote " . . . there inhere in all things by
nature certain constituents which are part and parcel of
their substance" (69).
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All three sets of global elements--linguistic,
cognitive, and contextually salient--interrelate in
distinctive ways to achieve textual coherence.

The

linguistic elements create an explicit and consistent thread
of co-reference, thus ensuring "the most fundamental
principle of language: the normative principle of logical
identity" (Waldron 197).

This set of cohering elements

performs the crucial role of maintaining the integrity of
the nucleus of natural language logic, a nucleus which
consists of logical identity and co-reference.
The cognitive elements encompass this nucleus of
logical identity and co-reference and enable the generation
and organization of content around and about it.

These

elements cross all registers and semantic domains and are
universal for all humans.

Significantly, central cognitive

processes are located at the limen of explicitnessimplicitness, and their life on the boundary allows them to
shift from the explicit to the implicit as linguistic
convention or concerns of salience dictate.
The contextually salient elements encompass the
cognitive elements as well as the linguistic elements and
establish the expectations and constraints of the rhetorical
situation.

These elements are not only the most implicit,

but also the most pervasive, the most ubiquitous, and the
most circumscribing.
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A Visual Metaphor of Global Coherence
The visual metaphor below offers another way of viewing
the elements of global coherence and their interrelationships.

contextually Salient Perspective
epistemological frames
most implicit
central metaphors
most circumscribing
sociological models
most pervasive
warrants
establish expectations
ellipsis
and constraints of
the rhetorical situation
Cognitive Perspective
given/new relationship
Gestalt
located at the explicit-implicit limen
central
cross all domains and registers
cognitive
}
universal for all humans
processes
effect both invention and arrangement
Linguistic Perspective
repetitiOn} most explicit
anaphora
effect reference, co-reference, and
cataphora
logical identity, thus comprising
ellipsis
the nucleus of natural language logic
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No metaphor is completely descriptive.

The metaphor

offered above, adapted from Niels Bohr's model of the atom,
does not capture the pervasiveness of contextual salience.
In order for it to do so, the model would have to be three
dimensional with fibers or force fields of a constraining
nature extending from it and throughout the three "levels."
Nonetheless, this metaphor captures several vital aspects of
the global perspectives.
For instance, the overarching nature of contextual
salience is accurately represented, as is the nucleus of
natural language logic, the integrity of which is maintained
by the linguistic level.

Too, the visual metaphor aptly

places the cognitive level, which is liminal regarding
explicit and implicit properties, between the most explicit
level, the linguistic level, and the most implicit level,
the contextual salience level.
Significantly, the three "concentric" levels of the
visual metaphor comprise a continuum of more-or-less
discrete force fields potentially in contact with any other
force field on any level, thus simulating the property of
parallel distributed processing.
Finally, instead of confining the focus of coherence to
the surface of a text at sentence level, this visual
metaphor enables one to comprehend better the multi-layered
complexity inherent in a globally coherent essay or
composition.
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Pedagogical Implications
This approach to global coherence offers the teacher of
composition distinct advantages over the conventional
accounts grounded principally in linguistic description of
the surface language of a text at the sentence level.

Seven

major advantages of this approach are that it
• allows for a full recognition of the
parts-to-whole and whole-to-parts relationship
• relates the parts-to-whole and whole-to-parts aspects
to bottom up and top down processing
• emphasizes the connections among rhetoric, the "real
world," and the elements of global coherence
• addresses both the linear and non-linear aspects of
global coherence and text production
• demonstrates that the abbreviation "coh" is
insufficient to indicate problems in coherence
• shows how central cognitive processes effect both
invention and arrangement
• provides the basis for determining the order in which
the global perspectives may be taught.
The first advantage of this approach is it allows for a
full recognition of the parts-to-whole
relationship.

a~d

whole-to-parts

Global coherence was defined as the

comprehensive, systematic connection of constitutive
elements of a text of logical discourse, with a consistent
emphasis on the totality of the text and on the
interrelatedness of its constituents (chapter I, p. 2).
significant notions are couched in this definition: the

Two
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notion of parts, i. e., the "constituents," and the notion
of whole, Le., the "totality of the text."

The

parts-to-whole and whole-to-parts relationships are depicted
in both the explicit-implicit continuum and the visual
metaphor.

The former offers constitutive elements along an

explicit-implicit continuum; these constitutive elements
comprise a totality resulting in the global coherence of an
essay or composition.

Similarly, the visual metaphor offers

a totality of constitutive elements in the form of the
global perspectives--the linguistic, cognitive, and
contextually salient perspectives.

In both the explicit-

implicit continuum and the visual metaphor, as well as in
the definition of global coherence, the parts-to-whole and
whole-to-parts relationships evince themselves as integral
to an understanding of global coherence.

It follows, then,

that an acute awareness of this relationship ought to be
central to one's pedagogy in the composition class.
The second advantage of this approach is it relates the
parts-to-whole and whole-to-parts aspects of global
coherence to bottom up and top down processing.

Any

approach toward coherence that focuses on one particular
language level, as in the Harbrace College Handbook with its
focus on the sentence level, or on one discourse level, as
in McCrimmon's Writing with a Purpose with its focus on the
paragraph, does not go far enough.

Instead, one needs an
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approach which emphasizes the parts-to-whole and the
whole-to-parts relationships.
If the composition teacher facilitates bottom up
processing of global elements in conjunction with top down
processing, i.e., if the student writer is encouraged to see
"the big picture" of the composition assignment, of what
sort of composition or essay might result, while also being
encouraged to see how the global elements may combine to
cohere a text, then that student's prospects for a
successful paper are enhanced.

Hence, the student writer

would be actively engaged in dual tasks.

An approach

incorporating the parts-to-whole/whole-to-parts dynamic also
meshes with recent studies in learning theory which suggest
that humans as individuals have different cognitive styles.
Some writers tend to begin a composition with "the big
picture" and then "flesh it out," while others begin with
several small observations and details and then build upon
them until a coherent composition emerges.
The third advantage of this approach is its emphasis on
the connections among rhetoric, the "real world," and the
elements of global coherence.

This emphasis stems from the

tri-partite nature of the approach, and that a significant
portion of the elements effecting global coherence are
extra-textual or implied. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
composition teacher to ensure that student writers
understand the significance, both rhetorical and "real
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world," of global elements such as warrants, central
metaphors, sociological models, and perhaps even
epistemological frames.

This does not mean, of course, that

a composition course be turned into miniature psycho- and
sociolinguistic courses, but this does mean that these
global elements need to be expressed in language appropriate
to the course level, for often they are crucial to top-down
or whole-to-parts processing.

And of course, these elements

are part-and-parcel to a cogent understanding of the
rhetorical situation.
The fourth advantage of this approach is it addresses
both the linear and non-linear aspects of global coherence
and text production.

If the cognitive perspective, and

particularly if the contextually salient perspective, is
accepted, then a pedagogical implication concerning
linearity emerges: many of the cohering elements of
successful composing are not linear. Composition teachers
must address this circumstance. Compositionalists must
engage student writers in non-linear thought, must stimulate
non-linear thought, and then face the larger challenge of
coaching and coaxing student writers into articulating their
non-linear thought into linear Edited American English.
Here a question about the traditional college essay arises,
however.

will the future college essay be solely one of

linear Edited American English, or will it take the form of
a multi-media presentation saved on a computer disk?
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Perhaps traditionalists need not be too alarmed, though, for
even if the future holds such a college essay, they can rest
fairly secure that the multi-media essay will require an
ample amount of linear articulation.
The fifth advantage of this approach is it demonstrates
that the abbreviation "cohn is insufficient to indicate
problems in coherence.

If one agrees that many elements,

such as those from the linguistic, cognitive, and
contextually salient perspectives, combine to cohere an
essay or composition, one might also raise the following
question: before a composition teacher responds to a problem
of coherence in a student paper by writing "cohn on the
paper, ought not that composition teacher first discern the
nature of the incoherence and be prepared to offer a
corrective tactic or strategy to the student writer apropos
the error?

A related question is, if the linguistic

elements of global coherence deal mostly with the
maintenance of identity, if central cognitive processes deal
mostly with the generation and organization of content, and
if contextually salient elements deal mostly with
expectations and constraints regarding lexicon, arrangement,
tone, and so forth, then will a simple "cohn suffice if a
student writer has a problem in anyone of these kinds of
cohering elements?

Put another way, should a composition

teacher be more specific with regard to symbols used to mark
problems in coherence?
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The sixth advantage of this study is it shows how
central cognitive processes effect both invention and
arrangement. Traditionally, words such as however, although,
and therefore have been viewed as conjunctive adverbs or
subordinate conjunctions, depending on whether they relate
main clauses or subordinate clauses.

From a purely

grammatical or surface language view, this may be
acceptable, but this position overlooks the shared nature of
all such transition words.

Such words not only bridge, but

actually are channels or kinds of thought as the section on
central cognitive processes indicates (chapter III, pp. 87102).

Central cognitive processes not only enable one to

generate thoughts, but also to organize them.

Because of

this double articulation, they are arguably the best
examples illustrating the fluid relationship between
invention and arrangement.

Ought they not, then, receive

special emphasis in the teaching of both invention and
arrangement of a composition?
The seventh advantage of this approach is it provides
the basis for determining the order in which the global
perspectives may be taught.

Should the llnguistic,

cognitive, and contextually salient perspectives be taught
collectively?

Or, perhaps, should only the cognitive and

contextually salient perspectives be taught, and student
writers having serious problems with the elements of the
linguistic perspective be sent to remediation?

with the
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latter view, would it be good to teach the contextually
salient view first by introducing its elements and the
expectations and constraints they signify?

As noted

earlier, these could be taught through the rhetorical
situation, through warrants, and through an introduction to
the levels of language use.

Then, central cognitive

processes could be taught along with their dual role of
generating and organizing content vis-a-vis the constraints
and expectations of the contextually salient elements.

The

composition teacher could then monitor for problems with the
linguistic elements.

Sygyzy
As far as is known, no other beings in the cosmos have
been accorded the scope and degree of spoken ability that
humans have, yet as wonderful as speech is, it alone would
not have taken humans very far from the cave.

written

language, however, with its ability to hypostasize thought,
thus enabling permanent records, reflection, and extended
discourse capable of revision, has exposed humans to
seemingly infinite frontiers within the human psyche, and
outside it, to the far, unfathomable reaches of space.
Surely, then, to fashion coherent, extended, written
discourse for a specific purpose to a specific audience
regarding a specific occasion--that is, to fashion a
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successful essay or composition--is to participate in a
uniquely human endeavor.
In the discipline of astronomy, one learns of a
phenomenon called syzygy.

Syzygy is a natural alignment of

elements--three celestial bodies--but it is not a continuous
alignment, and it occurs only when certain conditions and
perspectives coalesce; similarly, one may envision a kind of
syzygy in the coalescing of conditions and perspectives when
the writer successfully aligns the "certain constituents" of
the three global perspectives which are "part and parcel" of
a globally coherent essay or composition.

These

constituents are myriad, intricate, and amazingly interwoven, yet if the student writer can learn how to align the
perspectives and coalesce their elements into a successful
essay or composition, then he or she may well.experience a
sense of the sublime which Longinus extolls.

It is my hope

that this study will in some way help the teacher of
composition guide his or her students in the uniquely human
endeavor of generating successful essays.
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APPENDIX I
Halliday and Hasan argue in Cohesion in English that
the cohering operations of co-reference, substitution,
ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical cohesion are
non-structural.

This study in global coherence, however,

argues that co-reference and ellipsis are forms of
sUbstitution and that sUbstitution is structural in nature.
Details of this argument follow: fundamental to Halliday and
Hasan's approach to textual analysis is the notion of the
tie, which they define as "a single instance of cohesion, a
term for one occurrence of a pair of cohesively related
items" (5).

An example is "the relation between them and

six cooking apples" in the following:

[2:1]

Wash and core six cooking apples.
Put them into a fireproof dish.
A tie, then, is "best interpreted as a RELATION between
. two elements," one of which presupposes the other; a

tie is "also DIRECTIONAL," in that it is anaphoric
"presupposed element preceding") or cataphoric ("presupposed
element following")

(329).

Ties may be "IMMEDIATE,"

"MEDIATED," or "REMOTE" as the following passage
illustrates:
[2: 2]

The last word ended in a long bleat, so
like a sheep that Alice quite started
(1).
She looked at the Queen, who
seemed to have suddenly wrapped herself
up in wool (2). Alice rubbed her eyes,
and looked again (3). She couldn't make
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out what had happened at all (4). Was
she in a shop (5)? And was that
really--was it really a sheep that was
sitting on the other side of the counter
(6)? Rub as she would, she could make
nothing more of it (7).
(qtd. in
Halliday & Hasan 330)
Because the she in sentence (2) refers to Alice in
sentence (1), and the two sentences are contiguous, the tie
is immediate.

If the ties occur in three or more contiguous

sentences, then the ties are "MEDIATED," as for the she in
(5) and Alice in (3); the she in (4) mediates because it,
too, like the she in (5), presupposes Alice in (3).

If a

tie exists across a number of sentences with no mediated
ties in the intervening sentences, then the tie is "REMOTE,"
as for Rub as she would in (7) and Alice rubbed her eyes in
(3) •

In order for one to make sense of Rub as she would, one
has to refer back across intervening, non-mediating
sentences to Alice rubbed her eyes in (3)

(Halliday & Hasan

330-31) .
Cohesive ties are of five types, reflecting the five
sub-categories of cohesion: co-reference, .substitution,
ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical cohesion (4).
Halliday and Hasan treat the cohesive tie of
co-reference as a "semantic," not a "grammatical," relation
and view it as prior to the other types of cohesive ties
(most probably because they consider it a non-structural
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form of cohesion). Co-reference is viewed directionally and
semantically.
Co-reference viewed directionally is of two broad
categories: exophoric and endophoric.
Exophoric co-reference deals with co-reference outside
the text, i.e., to elements of the register, and thus is
considered "situational" co-reference.

Halliday and Hasan,

drawing from Bernstein, illustrate exophoric co-reference
with the following example:
[2:3]

They're playing football and he kicks it
and it goes through there it breaks the
window and they're looking at it and he
comes out and shouts at them because
they've broken it so they run away and
then she looks out and she tells them
off.
(qtd. in Halliday & Hasan 35)
In order for this passage to "make sense," one must

have information concerning the referents of the pronouns,
i.e., who they are, and perhaps what their roles are in the
context of the passage (35).

Significantly for

rhetoricians, Halliday and Hasan exclude exophoric reference
from their study of cohesion in English.
Endophoric co-reference deals with co-reference between
items in a text and is considered "textual" co-reference.
Endophoric co-reference is the co-reference of primary
concern for Halliday and Hasan.

Endophoric co-reference

subdivides into anaphoric and cataphoric co-reference, with
anaphoric referring back to an element located earlier in
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the text and cataphoric referring forward to an element in
the text, as the following examples indicate:
anaphoric co-reference

[2:4]

Jon swims very well; he swam the English Channel.
cataphoric co-reference

[2:5]

What I am going to say will interest you
immensely.
Susan has decided to study medicine in Tibet.
Co-reference viewed semantically is of three types:
personal, demonstrative, and comparative.

Personal

co-reference is "by means of function in the speech
situation" (37) and is exemplified in the following
sentences:
[2:6]

I bought a new car yesterday.

(pronoun)

(One can also argue that I is substituting for a
proper noun which lies outside the text, is
therefore exophoric (cf. [2:3], not endophoric,
and if one were to follow Halliday and Hasan's
logic, the use of I would then not be textual.
However, the definition of global coherence
encompasses exophoric co-reference. Regardless of
the directionality, it is argued here that the use
of I in this sentence is an example of
substitution.)
[2:7]

The salesman gave me a good

deal.

(pronoun)

(Again, the pronoun me sUbstitutes for a
proper noun.)
[2:8]

Now the car is mine.

(determiner)

(Here, mine sUbstitutes for the noun phrase
my car.)
[2:9]

Now my bank account is nearly empty.

(determiner)

(For this last sentence, one can argue that
my functions as a modifier in a noun
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phrase, not as a co-referent. Thus far,
the uses of Halliday and Hasan's semantic
co-reference are primarily that of
substitution.)
Halliday and Hasan's second type of co-reference,
demonstrative co-reference, is "essentially a form of verbal
pointing" (deixis) according to proximity (57), and is
realized in words such as this/these, here (near),
that/those, there, then (far), and the definite article the.
(Halliday and Hasan argue that the should be included with
the deictic words because the is a reduced form of that, and
the, while making its referent definite, may refer to
something in the register--exophorically--and thus qualifies
as cohesive.

It should be noted, however, that the focus of

Halliday and Hasan throughout their book is on endophoric
co-reference; thus, inclusion of the at the same status as
the other deictic words because of an exophoric property is
debatable.)
Examples of demonstrative co-reference are the
following:
[2:10]

I like the lions, and I like the polar bears.
These are my favorites (60).

[2:11]

We're going to the opera tonight.
first outing for months (60).

This'll be our

(One can argue that in [2:10], These is
either a truncated or elliptical
construction substituting for the noun
phrase these animals, and that in [2:11],
This sUbstitutes for the noun phrase our
going.)
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Halliday and Hasan state that what "probably accounts
for the majority of all instances" of demonstrative
co-reference is extended co-reference, in which the
demonstrative refers to a process or situation:
[2:12]

They broke a Chinese vase.
That was very careless.

(66)

That refers to the process involved which
resulted in the breaking of the vases.
(One can argue that That is actually
another example of sUbstitution: That = the
breaking of the vase.)

Halliday and Hasan's third type of co-reference,
comparative co-reference, is of two kinds, general and
particular.

General comparative co-reference is based on

the notions that "likeness is a referential property," and a
"thing cannot just be 'like'; it must be 'like something'"
(18). The comparison "may be in the situation or in the
text," it may be anaphoric and cataphoric, and it may be
structural or non-structural, and if it is non-structural
and in the text, then it is cohesive (78).

(1 argue in

chapter three that the latitude of situations and conditions
under which comparison operates, along with other reasons,
makes it a central cognitive process and is not a form of
co-reference.)
Examples of anaphoric and cataphoric general
comparative co-reference are, respectively, the following:
[2:13]

Sam is at the door; 1 was expecting someone
different.
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(One can argue that different is a
truncated or elliptical form of the phrase
different than Sam, and, in turn, that this
phrase is a truncated form of the
underlying clause a person who differs from
Sam, which modifies someone. Thus,
different is not used as co-reference, but
is used to indicate comparison, which is
treated in the cognitive perspective of
global coherence.)
[2:14]

She's a different breed than the one we had
before.
(Here, one can again argue that different
than is not used as co-reference, but is
used to indicate comparison, which is
treated as a central cognitive process in
the cognitive perspective in chapter three
of this study.)

Additionally, Halliday and Hasan tell us, "the
comparison may be internal--the likeness expressed as mutual
likeness without a referent appearing as a distinct entity"
(78), as the following illustrates:
[2:15]

Most people have the same breakfast every day.
(meaning 'the same as every other day')
(80)

[2:16]

The candidates gave three similar answers.
(meaning 'similar to each other')
(80)

[2:17]

All parties showed an identical reaction to the
news. (meaning 'reacted in the same way as each
other')
(80)
(In each of these cases, one can argue that
the words the same as, similar, and
identical principally indicate comparison,
a central cognitive process, and not
co-reference, i.e., none of the expressions
share referents, but they indicate
referents which share commonalities.)

Particular comparative co-reference "expresses
comparability between things in respect of a particular
property.
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[2:18]

We don't need any more mistakes.

[2:19]

The hare ran faster.

[2:20]

The sun shines brighter.
(One can make two additional arguments
here: 1) each of these examples have
elliptical constructions, e.g., [2:18] "We
don't need any more mistakes (than we
already have)" or [2:19] "The hare ran
faster (than the tortoise) ";
2) comparison, not co-reference, is
indicated by comparative forms more and

-ere )
Curiously, Halliday and Hasan end their discussion of
co-reference with the statement that "the different forms of
cohesion are nowhere sharply set apart one from another"
(87) •

In sum, from the examples above, one can make two
observations.

First, much of co-reference can be seen as a

form of sUbstitution.

Second, those examples of

co-reference which are not sUbstitution can be seen as forms
of comparison, a central cognitive process.

Such

recategorization simplifies the linguistic perspective of
global coherence.
Halliday and Hasan's second sUb-category of cohesion is
sUbstitution.

Halliday and Hasan argue that sUbstitution is

a relation between linguistic items, such as words
or phrases; whereas co-reference is a relation
between meanings. . . . co-reference is a relation
on the semantic level, whereas sUbstitution is a
relation on the . . . level of grammar and
vocabulary.
(89)
(They add that ellipsis "can be defined as
sUbstitution by zero . . . but the mechanisms
involved in the two [substitution and ellipsis]

164
are rather different, • • . and in the case of
ellipsis, fairly complex" [88-89].)
Examples of co-reference are the following:
[2:21]

John has moved to a new house.
He had it built last year.
(54)

[2:22]

Who are those colourful characters?
Those must be the presidential guards.

[2:23]

(63)

The little dog barked as noisily as the big one.
(82)

Examples of sUbstitution are the following:
[2:24]

My axe is too blunt.
(89 )

[2:25]

What kind of engines do you want?
Ones with whistles, or ones without?

[2:26]

I must get a sharper one.

(92)

These grapefruit smell more bitter than the last
ones we had.
(109)
(Halliday and Hasan argue that ones is an
example of sUbstitution if the grapefruit also
taste more bitter, but if they taste the same,
then ones is an example of co-reference, not
substitution.)

Although Halliday and Hasan argue co-reference occurs
at the "semantic level," and that sUbstitution occurs at the
level of "grammar" and "vocabulary," when one examines their
examples, one finds the distinction to be nebulous, for each
of their co-reference examples, [2:21] and [2:22], and their
sUbstitution example,

[2:25], indicate the same referent;

and their co-reference example, [2:23], and each of their
sUbstitution examples, [2:24] and [2:26], indicate different
referents.

What one does find in common for all examples is

that SUbstitution of a pro-form occurs.

Thus, if one omits

the co-reference/ SUbstitution distinction (or the
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semantic/grammatical distinction), one can avoid altogether
the sort of puzzling, "smell" vs. "taste" contretemps
presented by the grapefruit example [2:25].
substitution is of three types: nominal, verbal, and
clausal.

Nominal sUbstitution uses the words one, ones, or

same; verbal sUbstitution uses the word do; and clausal
sUbstitution uses the words so or not.

These word lists are

virtually inclusive, with only a few exceptions: the
expressions do so, and do the same, about which there is
some "indeterminacy," and general words such as thing,
"where sUbstitution shades into lexical cohesion" (91).
Examples of nominal sUbstitution are found in [2:24],
[2:25], and [2:26] above.
Examples of verbal sUbstitution are in the following
sentences:
[2:27]

. . . the words did not come the same as they
used to do.
(substitution for come)
(112)

[2:28]

I don't know the meaning of half those long
words, and, what's more, I don't believe you
do either!
(substitution for know the meaning of half those
long words)
(112)

Halliday and Hasan note that for do substitution, "the
contrastive element which provides the context for the
sUbstitution is located within the same clause," as in
[2:27] and [2:28] above, unlike in clausal sUbstitution
(below), in which "the clause is presupposed, and the
contrasting element is outside the clause" (130).
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Clausal sUbstitution occurs in the environment of
hypotaxis, i.e., one clause depends on another semantically,
but not through structural embedding (136).

Examples of

clausal sUbstitution are in the following sentences:
[2:29]

Is there going to be an earthquake?
It says so.
(so sUbstitutes for the entire
clause there is qoinq to be an earthquake, with
says serving as the contrastive environment)
(130)

[2:30]

(reported clause)
' . . . if you've seen them so often, of course you
know what they're like.'
'I believe so,' Alice replied thoughtfully.

[2:31]

[2:32]

(conditional clause)
Everyone seems to think he's guilty.
doubt he'll offer to resign.
(134)

(131)

If so, no

(modalized clause)
'Oh, I beg your pardon!' cried Alice hastily,
afraid that she had hurt the poor animal's
feelings.
'I quite forgot you didn't like cats.'
'Not like cats!' cried the Mouse, in a shrill,
passionate voice.
'Would you like cats if you
were me?'
'Well, perhaps not,' said Alice in a soothing
tone: . . . (134)

Lastly, regarding the use of not, Halliday and Hasan
relate that "the negative form of the clausal sUbstitute is
not" (133), as in the following example:
[2:33]

Has everyone gone home?

I hope not.

(133)

Halliday and Hasan's treatment of sUbstitution not only
offers numerous examples illustrating how it enables
cohesive ties in texts, but it also delineates kinds of
substitution--nominal, verbal, and clausal, and in their
contrast of verbal and clausal substitution, they draw
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attention to the hypotactic environment, an environment
which accounts for inter-clausal cohesive ties.
Ellipsis is the third major sub-category of cohesion in
Halliday and Hasan's schema, and although they state that
"ellipsis is simply 'substitution by zero,'" they argue that
for their purposes, it is "more helpful to treat the two
[substitution and ellipsis] separately" because "they are
two different kinds of structural mechanism, and hence show
rather different patterns" (142).

(It is interesting to

note what may be some inconsistency on Halliday and Hasan's
part in their using a structural property, i.e., "kinds of
structural mechanism," to justify their treatment of
ellipsis, while they continue to categorize ellipsis as
"non-structural.")
Halliday and Hasan seem a bit uncertain as to how to
justify their assigning ellipsis unto its own category, for
in one sentence they write "we can take as a general guide
the notion that ellipsis occurs when something that is
structurally necessary is left unsaid," and in the very next
sentence they state "that the essential characteristic of
ellipsis is that something which is present in the selection
of underlying ('systemic') option is omitted in the
structure--whether or not the resulting structure is in
itself 'incomplete'" (144).

Then, by way of summary, they

state again that
The difference between substitution and ellipsis is
that in the former a sUbstitution counter occurs in the
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slot, and this must therefore be deleted if the
presupposed item is replaced, whereas in the latter the
slot is empty--there has been sUbstitution by zero.
( 145)
Halliday and Hasan do not offer examples to illustrate
this difference; however, one might assume that the
following sentences illustrate how "substitution counter
occurs in the slot," and how it "must therefore be deleted
if the presupposed item is replaced" (145):
[2:34]

original: John is building a house.

[2:35]

sUbstitution: He is building a house.
(He is the "substitution counter" and presupposes
John. )

By replacing the presupposed item, John, with Sue, one has
[2:36]

original: Sue is building a house.

[2:37]

sUbstitution: She is building a house.

Clearly, the sUbstitution counter is not deleted, but
merely replaced by another sUbstitution counter.

Consider

an example with ellipsis, i.e., sUbstitution by zero:
[2:38]
[2:39]

original: One rabbit ran fast, and another rabbit
ran slowly.
sUbstitution: One rabbit ran fast, and another
(zero) ran slowly.

By replacing the presupposed item, rabbit, with dog,
one has
[2:40]

original: One dog ran fast, and another dog ran
slowly.

[2:41]

sUbstitution: One dog ran fast, and another (zero)
ran slowly.
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Hence, the structural mechanisms involved are not of
"two different kinds" (142) unless one assumes the
"substi tution counters", i. e., the instantiated nominal,
verbal, clause, or zero items, to differ in non-semantic
ways; further, the very same structural mechanism occurs,
viz., the structural operation of sUbstitution of
co-referential items.

Moreover, the underlying semantic

status, not surface representation, of the "presupposed
item" and the "substitution counter" is the determining
factor in this aspect of cohesion: their underlying semantic
status must be that of co-reference, and it matters not
whether the substitution counter is zero or an instantiated
nominal, verbal, or clause.

The structural operation which

effects the substitution is identical, and co-reference of
the presupposed item and the substitution item ensures
comprehension.
Halliday and Hasan also argue that much of the
distinction between sUbstitution and ellipsis rests on the
notions of single-element omission and branching clauses.
Halliday and Hasan hold that single-element omission does
not occur "WHERE THAT ELEMENT IS OTHERWISE OBLIGATORY"
(205), as in the following examples:
[2:42]

Has she taken her medicine?

[2:43]

She has taken.
(in this unacceptable sentence, the single
element, the complement, has been omitted) (202)
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However, one should consider an example of theirs before
accepting their argument.

In the following two sentences,

the second sentence omits a single element, the complement,
but according to Halliday and Hasan, this is not ellipsis
because it is not "an instance of omission, and involves no
presuppositions of any kind" (204), but rather an example of
a systematic variant "in which nothing is omitted, any more
than an expression of time or place can be said to be
'omitted' from a clause which does not contain one" (204).
[2:44]

Simon's playing.

[2:45]

Let's not interrupt.

(204)

First, it is arguable that something has been omitted
on two counts.

A sui species feature of English is its

tendency toward the pattern Subject-Verb-Object (or
Complement); English is commonly referred to as an SVO
language, and as such, native speakers of English usually
deem a Subject-Verb sentence incomplete if the verb is used
in a transitive sense.

For example, most native speakers of

English find incomplete the following utterance if no object
has been previously identified:
[2:46]

Let's watch.

(or Let's not watch.)

Likewise incomplete is,
[2:47]

Let's interrupt.

(or Let's not interrupt.)

Native speakers would feel something had been omitted in
[2:46] and in [2:47].

Likewise, if a native speaker is

presented with the sentences
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[2:48]

simon' splaying.

[2:49]

Let's not interrupt.

and then is asked "Let's not interrupt 'what?'" he or she
will normally answer "Simon" or "simon's playing."
Thus, it seems that an omission has occurred in the
sentence "Let's not interrupt."

Halliday and Hasan do not

explain the term "systematic variant," but whatever it is,
one cannot deny the native speaker's intuition that an
omission has occurred in "Let's not interrupt."

Although

the native speaker might not categorize it as such, it is an
omission of a single element.

Moreover, such an omission is

not the same as the "omission" of "time" or "place" from a
sentence, since virtually all utterances assume the
metaphysical constants of time and place.

Indeed, that is

why they are "unmarked" in dialog, and why speakers signify
a specific, non-metaphysical meaning of time and place by
using definite, explicit "markers" such as the words here,
now, there, and then whenever such reference is necessary
for coherence.
Much of the rest of the argument that ellipsis is
something more than zero sUbstitution and hence merits its
own category lies with ellipsis in question-and-answers such
as the following:

[2:50]

Is it Tuesday?

[2:51]

I don't know.

[2:52]

Can you make it stand up?

(212)
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[2:53]

If you keep still.

(213 )

[2:54]

When did they cancel the booking?

[2:55]

Did they?

[2:56]

John's coming to dinner.

[2:57]

John?

[2:58]

John's coming to dinner.

[2:59]

And Mary?

(213 )

(215)

(215)

In these cases, Halliday and Hasan do not contest the
omission as they do in sentences such as
[2:60]

simon' splaying.

[2:61]

Let's not interrupt.

(204)

Finally, and perhaps most telling for the composition
teacher who deals with problems in ellipsis resulting from
tangled clauses in student writing, Halliday and Hasan argue
that ellipsis does not occur in the following "branched"
clauses:
[2:62]

Either Peter will play his cello, or Sally her
guitar.
(203)

[2:63]

The cat catches mice in the summer.
-And the dog rabbits.
(203)

[2:64]

The cat won't catch mice in wint.er.
-Nor the dog rabbits.
(203)

[2:65]

sybil takes coffee very strong, but Joan very
weak.
(203)

Halliday and Hasan disqualify these sentences from
exhibiting ellipsis on two grounds: 1) ellipsis for them
involves "a form of pre-supposition between sentences," not
within a sentence (203); and 2) the omission deals with the
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omission of "single elements of clause structure (as well as
structures of any other rank)," i.e., with structure, and
"we [Halliday and Hasan] are confining our definition of
ELLIPSIS to its non-structural, cohesive sense" (203).
Accordingly, Halliday and Hasan argue that [2:63] and
[2:64] do not exhibit ellipsis because, in fact, they are
actually one sentence.
[2:66]

The cat catches mice in the summer.
-And the dog rabbits.
(203)

[2:67]

The cat won't catch mice in winter.
-Nor the dog rabbits.
(203)

However, consider the following versions of Julius
Caesar's famous triplet:
[2:68]

I came to Gaul.
I saw Gaul.
I conquered Gaul.

[2:69]

I came.
I saw.
I conquered.

[2:70]

I came; I saw; I conquered.

[2:71]

I came, I saw, I conquered.

Is [2:68] three sentences?
probably respond yes.
[2:68]?
no.

Most composition teachers would

Does ellipsis occur. in example

Most composition teachers would probably respond

Is [2:69] three sentences?

teachers would respond yes.

Again, most composition

Does ellipsis occur in (2:69]?

Most composition teachers would probably respond yes.
[2:70] three sentences?
might hesitate.

Here most composition teachers

Is the semicolon a weak period, making

Is
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[2:70] three sentences, or is the semicolon a strong comma,
making [2:70] a single sentence?

According to Halliday and

Hasan, if one views [2:70] as three sentences, then ellipsis
occurs, but if one views [2:70] as a single sentence, then
ellipsis does not occur.

Is [2:71] three sentences?

Most

composition teachers would respond no, that [2:71] is a
single sentence.
Does ellipsis occur in [2:71]?

Most composition

teachers would respond yes, ellipsis does occur.
this be?

How can

Does ellipsis, a significant feature of cohesion,

hinge on whether a string of clauses is separated by
semi-colons, commas, or periods?

Surely not, for the

semantic relationships are the same in each of the examples.
Moreover, Halliday and Hasan argue that sentences like those
below do not exhibit ellipsis because in each case the
omission deals with the omission of "single elements of
clause structure (as well as structures of any other rank),"
and "we [Halliday and Hasan] are confining our definition of
ELLIPSIS to its non-structural, cohesive sense" (203):
[2:72]

Either Peter will play his cello, or Sally her
gui tar.
( 2 03 )

[2:73]

Sybil takes coffee very strong, but Joan very
weak.
(203)

However, the position regarding the omission of a single
element can be countered with Halliday and Hasan's own
example below in which a single element has been omitted.
[2:44]

Simon's playing.
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[2:45]

Let's not interrupt.

(204)

This argument, as stated earlier, is based on the SVO
(Complement) tendency in the English language.

The native

speaker intuits that something has been omitted in [2:45]
and will easily supply a suitable element to "complete" the
sentence.

In addition, such an omission, contrary to

Halliday and Hasan's position, is not the same as the
"omission" of "time" or "place" from a sentence, but instead
is an omission of a situation- specific element unique to
that speech act.
In light of the above arguments, and in light of
Halliday and Hasan's uncertainty over the status of
ellipsis, I will, for the purposes of this study in global
coherence, consider ellipsis a form of substitution, and one
which is achieved through a structural operation involving
the sUbstitution of a zero item co-referential with the
presupposed item.

(For additional arguments supporting this

position, one can refer to Dressler, Lakoff, Green,
Dougherty, and Steinitz.)

APPENDlxn
Jerry Fodor's functional taxonomy of cognition may be
thought of as a cognitive flow among the following
components: INPUT OF DATA => TRANSDUCER => INPUT SYSTEM
(MODULE) => CENTRAL SYSTEM.

These components are described

in more detail below.
INPUT OF DATA consists of data input through any of the
sensory channels, i.e., visual, auditory, tactile,
olfactory, or taste.

For example, input of data along the

visual channel would trace the photons as they enter the
visual channel and make their way through the channel to a
transducer.
TRANSDUCERS put all input data into a particular format
without any change in the content of the data.

To quote

Fodor: transducers "preserve the informational content of
their inputs, altering only the format in which the
information is displayed" (41).
INPUT SYSTEMS (MODULES) "mediate between transducer
outputs and central cognitive mechanisms by encoding the
mental representations which provide domains for the
operations" of the CENTRAL COGNITIVE SYSTEMS (42); modules
"pair transduced representations with formulas in the
domains of central processes" (70) involving "mediated
mappings from transducer outputs onto percepts--mappings
that are effected via the computation of interlevels of
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representation of the impinging stimulus" (60).
following is a descriptive list of the more

The

important

characteristics of modules:
informationally encapsulated: there is
limited, if any, access to information
outside the module itself during input
processing
domain specific: "the range of inputs for
which [a module] computes analyses" is
limited (103)
limited central access: only "the final
consequences of input processing" are
available to central systems
(56)
hardwired/stable: "the grain of their
physical architecture quite closely parallels
the grain of their virtual architecture [sets
of programming instructions]"
(37)
computationally autonomous: all that is
necessary for performance of the
inference-like operations is contained in the
module's neuro-anatomy
computationally local: stimulus driven;
insensitive to an individual's belief system;
a module may not access other modules during
processing, but may access memory at or near
completion of the process
shallow outputs: e.g., "the visual analysis
system can report only upon the shapes and
colors of things," not about photons (this
demarcates perception and cognition: "all
higher-level integrations," i.e., above
shapes and colors of things, is
post-perceptual)
not assembled: not constructed of simpler,
more basic systems
mandatory: the individual has no choice in
a module's operation
fast: much faster than the 250 milliseconds
required for shadowing (repeating what one is hearing)
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specific breakdown pattern: a pathology can
cause a module to malfunction and evince
behavior peculiar to the module, e.g, agnosia
or aphasia
Modules, then, are "computationally elaborated" (83)
and work from the sensory channels and language.

Each

module acts as a computational-confirmational mechanism
"which projects and confirms a certain class of hypotheses
on the basis of a certain body of data" (68).
An available hypothesis might be a word sequence that
could be constructed from "entries in the subjects's mental
lexicon" (68).

Such a hypothesis (which would be lexical),

is paired with input sensory data; this pair is given a
value "which expresses the degree of confirmation" that the
sense datum "bestows" upon the lexical hypothesis (68).
Once the hypothesis is constructed and given a value,
the input system can access a central system (e.g., memory)
to confirm that the input may very well represent a panther
or a convertible (often invoking a basic category), or a
sentence type/logical linguistic form.

This confirmation

informs the subject what has been said, but not what has
been meant.
Another way to view the module as an inferenceperforming system is in a premise/conclusion relationship:
premises are "transduced representations of proximal
stimulus configurations" (e.g., a transduction of
information resulting from input of photons); conclusions
are "representations of the character and distribution of
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distal objects" (e.g., a representation of a panther as it
appears in the world of things)

(42).

central systems subsume modules and fixate belief
(perceptual and non-perceptual) by monitoring what modules
deliver, by accessing memory, and then by computing a "best
hypothesis" concerning "what the world is like" (104).
The following is a list of some of the more important
characteristics of central systems, many of which are the
inverse of modular characteristics:
not hardwired/unstable: neuroanatomy
"relatively diffuse
(118)
quasi assembled: a larger system composed
of simpler systems
informationally unencapsulated: central
systems access information from each other
and from modules
domain neutral: "cut across cognitive
domains"
(101)
computationally global: may draw on other
central systems or modules to perform
operations
sensitive to belief system: during
computation, central systems consider an
individual's set of beliefs
isotropic: confirmation-relevant facts can
be "drawn from anywhere in the field 'of
previously established empirical truths"
(105)
Quineian: "the degree of confirmation
assigned to any given hypothesis is sensitive
to properties of the entire belief system; as
it were, the shape of our whole science bears
on the epistemic status of each scientific
hypothesis"
(107)
optional engagement: the operation of a
central system is not necessarily mandatory,
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but can be elective

variable speed: may be very slow or
instantaneous
Here, it is posited that the above described central
systems may be thought of as central cognitive processes,
i.e., specific central systems which possess distinguishing
characteristics of their own while simultaneously possessing
all the characteristics detailed above.
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